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 How  Oracle  Erred 
 The “Use/Explanation Distinction” and the Future of 
Computer Copyright * 
 Wendy J.  Gordon ** 
 Abstract 
 In  Oracle  v.  Google (2015), the Federal Circuit addressed whether the “method header” 
components of a dominant computer program were uncopyrightable as “merging” 
with the headers’ ideas or function. Google had copied the headers to ease the 
ability of third-party programmers to interact with Google’s Android platform. The 
court rebuffed the copyrightability challenge; it reasoned that because the plaintiff’s 
expression  might have been written in alternative forms, there was no “merger” of idea 
and expression. But the  Oracle court may have been asking the wrong question. 
 In  Lotus  v.  Borland (1995), the owner of a dominant spreadsheet program sought to 
prevent a new competitor’s program from making available a set of “command menu” 
headers based on the dominant program’s menus. The defendant also wrote its own, 
original command menus, but provided the copied menus as an option to relieve 
customers who, migrating from the dominant spreadsheet, would otherwise have had 
a substantial burden to master new terms and rewrite macros.  
 In assessing the legality of the copying in  Lotus , the First Circuit started its inquiry not 
with a question about how the plaintiff’s program might have been written, but rather 
with how the program  actually was written. It then identifi ed the menu commands 
as “methods of operation” because they were necessary to make the actual program 
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operate a computer. The copyright statute renders “methods of operation” per se 
uncopyrightable, regardless of the possibility of alternatives.  
 Debates over the confl ict between  Oracle and  Lotus have largely ignored a middle 
road that supports the  Lotus result without the potential for overkill some observers see 
in  Lotus . This middle road is a doctrine known as the “explanation/use” distinction. Laid 
out in the classic Supreme Court case of  Baker  v.  Selden (1880), and ratifi ed by statutory 
provisions of the Copyright Act including the much-ignored § 113(b), the “explanation/
use distinction” specifi es that a copyright owner has no power to control behaviors that 
belong to the domain of utility patent. Like “merger” and “method of operation,” the 
“explanation/use” doctrine implements the deference that, pursuant to Congressional 
command and Supreme Court precedent, U.S. copyright law must give to patent law. 
However, the explanation/use doctrine operates by limiting the  scope of the exclusive 
rights a copyright owner might otherwise possess, not by targeting the copyrightability 
of what plaintiff produced.  
 This chapter examines justifi cations for the “explanation/use distinction”, and 
suggests a two-part test for implementing that doctrine. The chapter argues that a 
copyright owner should have no prima facie rights over copying behavior where (1) the 
goals of the copying are “use” (behavior in the realm of utility patent) and (2)  the 
copying is done solely for goals unrelated to the expressiveness of the plaintiff’s work 
of authorship. (The copying of Oracle and Lotus seem to have been fully indifferent 
to expressive values; the result might be different in a case where defendant’s goals are 
mixed.) 
 This two-part test is met by the defendants in  Oracle and  Lotus. (1)  Making a 
machine operate is clearly utilitarian. And as for (2) indifference to expression, both 
 Lotus and  Oracle involve someone copying a computer interface to enable users to 
interoperate: third-party programmers could use or design Java-enabled programs on 
Android, and spreadsheet users could use their prior macros on a new spreadsheet 
program. Interoperability is one of the few areas where indifference to expression is 
clear: After all, when one wants a spare key made, the elegance or beauty of the key’s 
shape is irrelevant – all that matters is that the shape fi ts the lock. 
    
 11.1.  Introduction 
 The world would look far different than it does if copyright law covered functional 
expression without limit. Someone who imagines they can “build a better mouse 
trap” would need only to sketch it on paper, or draw it on a computer screen 
and hit “save,” 1 to secure for the purported innovation over seventy years of legal 
 1  Nations differ on the extent to which “fi xation in a tangible medium” is required for copyright, and 
as to the defi nition of “fi xation.” Under U.S. law pre-1978, saving a screen drawing to a computer disk 
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protection 2 against copying. 3 Anyone else who makes or sells a similar device 
would be in danger of suit. 4 By similarly simple means, any car maker or other 
manufacturer could eliminate competition in the making of spare parts. 
 Markets for physical products are not the only things that would change. So 
would markets for electronics and digital content. If copyright had no boundaries 
where functionality was concerned, a designer of a leading video game could 
choose one console and, by asserting its copyright, could forever 5 limit its fans to that 
console. Similarly a console maker could bar any “unlicensed” game from playing 
on its machine. Or the seller of an application program could ensure that once 
its customers learn the program’s intricacies and prepare macros 6 based upon its 
would not have qualifi ed as a copyrightable “writing” because it could not be visually perceived from 
the disk except with the aid of a machine; post-1978, direct visual perception became unnecessary. 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defi nition of “copy”). Unless otherwise specifi ed, all references to law are to 
federal law of the United States. 
 2  U.S. Copyrights that come into being today have a duration of either (a) seventy years beyond the life 
of the author, or (b) the shorter of 120 years from creation or ninety-fi ve years from publication (for 
works made for hire and some other categories). 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). Utility patents by contrast have 
a duration of no more than twenty years. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (providing that utility patents end 
twenty years from fi ling date). Design patents are even shorter – fi fteen years from the date of grant. 
35 U.S.C. § 173 (2012), as amended by Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 
91–190, § 102, 125 Stat. 1527 (2012). 
  The instant chapter is concerned with the intersection of copyright law with the law of utility patents. 
That is where the most signifi cant confl ict with copyright occurs. Design patents pose no such tension 
for copyrights because, like copyrights, they are supposed to be unavailable for elements that are 
“functional.” See L. A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“If the 
particular design is essential to the use of the article, it cannot be the subject of a design patent.”). 
 3  There was a period when United Kingdom and Canadian law took this extreme path. See, e.g., 
Spiro-Flex Indust. Ltd. v. Progressive Sealing Inc., 1986 CanLII 771 (BC SC), available at  www.canlii 
 .org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/1986/1986canlii771/1986canlii771.html. 
  Both nations now take a somewhat more patent-deferential approach to design protection. 
 4  Admittedly, copyright gives rights only over “copying.” By contrast, patent infringement can arise 
regardless of whether or not the defendant who makes and sells a version of the patented innovation 
has copied it or independently invented it. 
  But the copyright plaintiff’s need to prove actual “copying” (a kind of “cause in fact”) is less of a 
barrier to lawsuits than it once was. Given the pervasiveness of mass media, and the internet’s ability 
to give access largely without regard to geographic boundaries, copyright defendants fi nd it harder to 
prove they never had contact with a plaintiff’s work. Also, because subconscious copying can trigger 
copyright liability, at least in the United States, defendants cannot be sure that telling their truth on 
the witness stand (“I cannot remember copying and I believe I did not copy”) will make a difference, 
even if the jury believes them. 
 5  A game (if a work for hire) would have copyright for roughly a century. Each new version of the 
game would have a new, full-duration copyright in any distinguishable variations added since the 
prior version. By continually tweaking its games, a company whose copyright knew no functional 
boundaries could lock its fan base into a particular platform for as long as the fan base continued to 
exist. By the time that the original version of a game entered the public domain, there would likely be 
no machines left capable of playing it. 
 6  A user can assign a complex set of commands to a simpler keystroke command. This is called writing 
a “macro.” For example, in using a word processing program, someone who authors documents 
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keystroke commands, the customers’ learning and all their macros will be worthless 
if they ever switch to a new provider. The makers of computers, smart phones, or 
game consoles could limit use of their machines only to programs, apps, and games 
of which the makers approve. 
 But copyright law does  not cover functional expression without limit. Most of 
the results just described could not be achieved through copyright, 7 for both 
Congress and the courts have sharply limited copyright’s operation in the fi eld of 
functionality. 8 Copyright law defers to patent when it comes to functional use, and 
patents are short-lived and hard to get. 
 Moreover, patent law jealously guards the public domain status of the functional 
works that it declines to protect. In the words of the Supreme Court, “the federal 
patent laws  do create a federal right to ‘copy and to use,’” 9 – a right which is applicable 
both to expired patents and to “potentially patentable ideas which are fully exposed 
to the public.” 10 The patent public domain similarly assures “ ‘the consuming public 
of the advantage to be derived’ from free exploitation” 11 of discoveries with expired 
or invalid patents. 12 So, unsurprisingly, many forms of right (including copyright, 13 
containing many lengthy quotations might tell her program that a particular keystroke combination 
(say, hitting “control-alt-q” at the same time) should put highlighted text into quotation form: indenting 
it and making it single-spaced. Thereafter, she could properly format long quotes just by highlighting 
the relevant text and hitting control-alt-q. 
 7  Regarding the examples just mentioned: an attractively shaped automobile bumper or muffl er pipe 
that lacks patent can be freely copied (unless some aspect of it is a separable work of authorship, which 
is unlikely), 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“defi nition of pictorial, graphic and sculptural works”); an original 
drawing of a mouse trap or other functional object can have copyright as a pictorial work, but the 
rights of the copyright owner do not extend to control over the manufacture and sale of the objects 
depicted, 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (2012); copyright’s fair use doctrine, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012), permits the 
copying of copyrighted computer programs for the purpose of making a video game compatible with 
existing consoles. See Spiro-Flex Indust. Ltd. v. Progressive Sealing Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 
1992) (“Accolade did not attempt to ‘scoop’ Sega’s release of any particular game or games, but sought 
only to become a legitimate competitor in the fi eld of Genesis-compatible video games. Within that 
market, it is the characteristics of the game program as experienced by the user that determine the 
program’s commercial success. As we have noted, there is nothing in the record that suggests that 
Accolade copied any of those elements.”). 
 8  Many of these limits are discussed at length  infra. 
 9  Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 164–5 (1989) (emphasis in original) 
 10  Id. (citations omitted). 
 11  Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t,  LLC , 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2407 (2015) (quoting  Scott Paper Co. v. 
Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945)). 
 12  Kimble , 576 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2405 (upholding the rule that royalty contracts are unenforceable 
to the extent they provide for the payment of royalties after the point of patent expiration.) The 
Supreme Court in  Kimble may have had some doubts about the wisdom of the particular rule it 
upheld, but did not seem to harbor doubts about the importance of the patent public domain. 
 13  See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (no copyright for systems or methods of operation);  id . § 113(b) (no 
infringement results from building a useful article depicted in a copyrighted portrayal). These and 
other limits are discussed  infra , passim. 
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trademark, 14 and contract 15 ) are limited lest they undermine the “balance between 
fostering innovation and ensuring public access to discoveries” that “Congress 
struck” “[i] n crafting the patent laws.” 16 
 The boundary doctrines that enforce copyright’s deference to patent are 
continually threatened with erosion. In particular, the recent decision in  Oracle 
 v.  Google 17 threatens to expand copyright’s reach into functionality. That decision, 
by the Federal Circuit, increases the ability of market leaders to use copyright law 
to lock out competition in a functional market – and to lock their customers, their 
suppliers, and producers of complementary products into patterns that might be 
privately profi table, but ineffi cient or otherwise undesirable from a social perspective. 
 As a social practice, lock-in is quite controversial. Business schools teach future 
executives how to lock in their customers and other players, 18 yet antitrust law makes 
some forms of lock-in unlawful. 19 Scholars debate whether various examples of 
potential lock-in might be socially harmful, socially useful, or irrelevant to social 
welfare, 20 and how the law should take lock-in into account. 21 Such arguments need 
not be resolved for cases like  Oracle  v.  Google. That is because, in the context of 
computer programs, the techniques that companies use to enforce lock-in typically 
 14  No trademark can be federally registered if it is “functional,” 12 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2012), and no 
unregistered trademark can give rise to suit under the Lanham Act unless the plaintiff carries the 
burden of proving nonfunctionality. 12 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2012);  Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz Gmbh 
v. Ritter Gmbh , 289 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 15  Kimble , 576 U.S. ___ (2015) (slip opinion of June 22, 2015, available at  www.supremecourt.gov/
opinions/14pdf/13-720_jiel.pdf ), 135 S. Ct. 2401 (royalty contracts held unenforceable to the extent 
they provide for the payment of royalties after the point of patent expiration). 
 16  Id. , 576 U.S. ____, slip opinion at *8. 
 17  Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) [hereinafter Oracle II] (holding Java’s 
applied programming interface (API) and its structure, sequence and organization, copyrightable as 
against claims of “merger” and “method of operation”). The lower court had held the copied portions 
of Java uncopyrightable as “methods of operation.” Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 
974, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2012) [hereinafter Oracle I]. 
 18  See, e.g.,  Kenneth J.  Sousa  &  Effy  Oz ,  Management Information Systems (7th Ed.  Cengage , 
 2015 ) at  41 , 47–8. 
 19  See  Herbert J.  Hovenkamp ,  Mark D.  Janis , &  Mark A.  Lemley ,  IP and Antitrust:  An 
Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law , sec. 21.4 (2d ed., 
 Aspen Publishers ,  2010 ). 
 20  Compare, e.g.,  Stan J.  Liebowitz &  S. E.  Margolis ,  The Fable of the Keys ,  30  J. Law Econ .  1 , ( 1990 ), 
with  Paul A.  David ,  Clio and the Economics of QWERTY , 75 Am. Econ. Rev.  332 ( 1985 ). 
 21  One issue is the doctrinal category through which to address lock-in. The instant article makes lock-in 
relevant to the scope of a copyright owner’s prima facie rights, but the relevance arises indirectly: What’s 
important to this chapter’s analysis is whether copying is functional, expressive, or a mixture of both, 
and copying done to escape lock-in is likely to be nonexpressive and purely functional. 
   Lock-in might also be relevant to copyrightability, to misuse, or to fair use. The Solicitor General, 
for example, argues that lock-in should be examined under the fair use doctrine. See, e.g., Brief for 
the United States as Amicus Curiae, Oracle II, 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014), at *17,  available at 
 www.justice.gov/sites/default/fi les/osg/briefs/2015/06/01/14-410_google_v_oracle_us_cvsg_brief.pdf. 
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run afoul of a historic doctrine called the “use/explanation” distinction. 22 The 
doctrine distinguishes between behaviors that use a copyrighted work expressively 
and those that use the work without regard to its expressive virtues, simply to serve 
a utilitarian function. 
 For example, it is an expressive use when the publisher of a how-to book on home 
repair copies someone else’s copyrighted passage explaining how to rewire a lamp 
instead of writing his own instructions. It is a nonexpressive use when a homeowner 
applies the same copyrighted passage to the task of actually rewiring lighting fi xtures. 
Copying text to convey an explanation or to serve other expressive goals belongs to the 
realm of copyright; copying to build a functional invention instead belongs to the realm 
of patent. These basic points about the limited rights that attach to copyright in the 
design of physical products have important implications for computer copyright cases. 
 As a result of how the  Oracle  v.  Google litigation has been structured, the legal 
community concerned with computer copyright is currently focused on issues of 
copyrightability. It is time to redirect our attention to include the scope of a copyright 
owner’s exclusive right. 
 This chapter will show how the fundamental distinction between “use” and 
“explanation” can resolve disputes like  Oracle v.  Google. The chapter will also 
explore a much-ignored provision in Copyright law, § 113(b) that provides an explicit 
immunity for using copyrighted works functionally. 
 11.2.  Oracle  v.   Google 
 Oracle owns the Java set of programs, and Java is ubiquitous. Third-party 
programmers are able to make their apps compatible with many platforms, and save 
time in doing so, because large numbers of platforms are crafted to respond to Java 
commands with predefi ned Java routines and subroutines. The Java routines are 
activated when a programmer uses a specifi ed “method header” accompanied by 
a statement – in particular format – of the desired inputs for a method’s operation. 
Platforms are typically programmed to recognize Java method headers (sometimes 
called “declaration code”) and to implement the appropriate Java routines and 
subroutines (sometimes called “implementation code”) in response. 
 22  This chapter is focused on uses that are functional (because functional uses implicate patent law) and 
indifferent to expressivity (for the indifference removes a reason for enforcing copyright). Lock-in and 
the imposition of switching costs raise many other issues in addition. For example, when a copyright 
owner’s acts of dissemination and enforcement combine in a way that negatively alters another’s 
prospects, I argue that this does and should erode the owner’s scope of right. See generally  Wendy 
J.  Gordon ,  A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of 
Intellectual Property ,  102  Yale L. J.  1533 ( 1993 ). 
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 Google, wanting to facilitate third-party programming for the Android phone, 
tried to obtain a Java license but the parties failed to fi nd mutually agreeable 
terms. 23 Much of Java is available under General Public License terms, 24 but 
Google apparently found the free-software license restrictions inconsistent with 
its business plan. Since in copyright law, unlike patent, duplication without 
copying is not infringing, Google therefore used independently written 
implementing code to substitute for Java’s implementing code. 25 Wrote the 
lower court:
 It is the method body that does the heavy lifting, namely the actual work of 
taking the inputs, crunching them, and returning an answer. The method 
body can be short or long. Google came up with its own implementations for 
the method bodies and this accounts for 97  percent of the code for the 37 
packages.” 26 
(As for patent, Oracle brought patent claims against Google, 27 but the jury 
rejected them.) 
 It was clear that Google’s clean-room code did not copy Java’s implementing code 
(some minor items aside), and it is implementing code that does the “heavy lifting.” 28 
However, something signifi cant was copied:  to enable the Android platform to 
 recognize what a third-party program might ask for, Google copied from Oracle’s 
Java program many of its method headers, and by necessary implication, some of 
Java’s selection and organization. 
 For example, a particular small program in Java might function to compare two 
integers, and tell you which one is larger. An ordinary programmer writing an app 
might be able to easily write this program for herself, but it’s even easier to call 
on the Java program called MAX. A third-party programmer can call on thousands 
of such routines to save time  – so long as the platform at which her program is 
aimed recognizes the “method headers” and inputs she has employed. Java’s slogan 
is “write once, run anywhere.” 29 
 Google wanted its programs for the Android platform to recognize the familiar 
identifying language. If instead of using the Java label “MAX” and its syntax, 
 23  Oracle II, 750 F.3d at 1350. 
 24  David Turner,  The LGPL and Java , available at  www.gnu.org/licenses/lgpl-java.html (last visited June 
8, 2015). 
 25  Oracle II, 750 F.3d at 1350. 
 26  Oracle I, 872 F. Supp. at 980, rev’d Oracle II, 750 F. 3d 1339. 
 27  Patents as well as copyrights can exist in computer programs under today’s law. The extent of their 
eligibility for patent may be limited, however. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S.Ct. 
2347, 2357 (2014). 
 28  Oracle I, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 980,  rev’d by Oracle II, quoted above in text accompanying  note 26 . 
 29  Oracle II, 750 F.3d at 1350.  
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 Google had given the Android subroutine that performed the same function a different 
name, like “LARGER,” then the Android platform would be signifi cantly harder for 
the Java-accustomed programming community to use. That is, without the “method 
headers,” the third-party programmers would have found it more diffi cult to make 
their programs speak to Google’s (noninfringing) implementing code. Also, lacking 
the “method headers” would mean that the Android platform could not be backwards 
compatible with existing application programs that use Java – because when one of 
those programs needs a subroutine to fi nd the larger of two integers, the program calls 
what it needs “MAX.” 
 In order to compete on a level playing fi eld with platforms running Java, therefore, 
Google needed not only to provide functionality as good as Java’s. It also needed its 
Android platform to recognize the known method headers and inputs (specifi ed in 
Java’s declaration code) that identifi ed functions that the third-party programmers 
would want performed by Android’s new and noninfringing implementation code. 
 In copying the headers, and making its own modules that mimicked Java functioning, 
Google also copied by necessity some organization from Java. 30 In particular, Google 
copied the  selection of those functions that were important enough to be worth creating 
an implementation and header for them. 31 
 The District Court ruled that Google only copied uncopyrightable elements of Java, 
and found no infringement. 32 On appeal, however, the Federal Circuit held that the 
headers could have copyrights (as could their organizational structure), largely because 
many alternative ways to express and organize the headers 33 had been open to Oracle’s 34 
programmers. 
 In so holding, Federal Circuit rejected the persuasive power of a 1995 First Circuit 
decision,  Lotus  v.  Borland. 35 The cases posed similar issues. 
 In  Lotus , a challenger to the then-dominant spreadsheet program had created a fully 
independent spreadsheet program, one having its own implementation code. The 
new program also independently wrote its own structure of commands. 36 However, the 
 30  Organizational elements are sometimes treated as potentially copyrightable compilations. See 17 
U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“A ‘compilation’ is a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting 
materials or of data that are  selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as 
a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.”) (emphasis added). 
 31  Oracle II, 750 F.3d at 1350–51.  
 32  Id. 
 33  See id ., at 1361 (“. . .merger cannot bar copyright protection for any lines of declaring source code 
unless Sun/Oracle had only one way, or a limited number of ways, to write them.”). 
 34  By “Oracle” here, I also include Oracle’s predecessor in interest, Sun. It was Sun’s programmers who 
largely created Java. 
 35  Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995),  aff’d by an equally divided Court , 
516 U.S. 233 (1996). 
 36  Virtually all application programs have command hierarchies; as a common example, users might be 
instructed to hit the F key to open a “File” menu, on which the user might then fi nd sub-commands 
such as “Save” or “Save As.” 
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newcomer program also allowed its users to trigger an optional interface that emulated 
the dominant spreadsheet’s command structure. Through the emulation interface, users 
switching from the established spreadsheet program to the new program could utilize 
their existing knowledge-base regarding keystrokes. In addition, many consumers had 
written macros to customize the earlier program to their purposes; 37 such consumers 
could continue using their macros on the new program only through the emulation 
interface. The emulator – a copied set of commands ordered in a particular way – made 
the users’ existing macros interoperable with the new spreadsheet program. 
 To make the emulation interface required the new program to copy both the 
command headers and some organization from the market leader. The latter 
company sued for copyright infringement, but lost. The First Circuit held that the 
copied commands and their hierarchy were “methods of operation.” 38 Given the 
statutory command that “In no case does copyright protection for an original work 
of authorship extend to any . . ., method of operation . . .,” 39 the First Circuit held 
that the command hierarchy could be copied. Further, the court explained, “The 
fact that Lotus developers could have designed the Lotus menu command hierarchy 
differently is immaterial to the question of whether it is a ‘method of operation’.” 40 
 As mentioned above, the Federal Circuit in  Oracle v. Google vigorously disagreed 
with the  Lotus analysis of copyrightability. 41 The  Oracle court instead ruled for 
plaintiff on this initial copyrightability issue, 42 arguing that because all computer 
programs are methods of operation, adherence to the  Lotus holding would deny 
copyright for all computer programs and thus frustrate Congressional intent. 43 
 37  A macro is a kind of mini-program. Typically, macros are crafted as short-cuts by persons using word 
processors, spreadsheets, or other application programs. The user states the commands she embeds in 
the macro sequence by specifying keystrokes.  The meaning of each keystroke depends on whatever 
nomenclature and command structure the application program has specifi ed for its user interface. 
 38  Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l , 49 F.3d at 816. 
 39  Id . at 815–16. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) is the cited statutory section; in full Section 102(b) states: “In 
no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, 
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which 
it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” It is usually assumed that “ideas” 
and “concepts” are outside copyright because of free speech concerns (see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 
186 (2003); that “discover[ies]” are outside copyright because they are not original (see Feist Pubs., 
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Svc. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (“facts do not owe their origin to an act of 
authorship”); and that Congress put “system[s] ” and “method[s] of operation” outside of copyright in 
order to maintain patent’s dominance over functionality. 
 40  Lotus , 49 F.3d at 816 aff’d by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996). 
 41  Oracle II, 730 F.3d at 1361. 
 42  This ruling may not be determinative of the ultimate outcome, of course. Although the Federal 
Circuit’s decision reversed a decision that no copyright resided in the material copied from Oracle, 
copyrightability is only one of the relevant issues. A petition for certiorari having been turned down, 
135 S. Ct. 2887 (June 29, 2015) (No. 14–410), the case is being remanded.  Oracle II, 750 F.3d at 1339. 
 43  Oracle II, 750 F.3d at 1361, cert. denied , 1361  cert. denied , 135 S. Ct. 2887 (June 29, 2015) (No. 14–410), 
 available at  www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/062915zor_4g25.pdf . 
9781107132375c11_p319-372.indd   327 4/5/2016   7:55:37 PM
Wendy J. Gordon328
 It is on the copyrightability dispute between the First and Federal Circuits that 
the defendant Google relied in seeking Supreme Court review. Although  cert was 
denied, 44 it is useful to see how Google’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari framed the 
disputed question:
 Whether copyright protection extends to all elements of an original work of 
computer software, including a system or method of operation, that an author 
could have written in more than one way. 45 
 These two views of copyrightability – one upholding copyright when “alternative” 
expressions existed, and one refusing to look for “alternatives” when faced with 
a method of operation – also dominated discussion of  Oracle . Yet approaches to 
copyrightability need not determine the overall outcome of cases like  Oracle and 
 Lotus . Central to both  Lotus 46 and  Oracle 47 is the iconic Supreme Court case,  Baker 
v.  Selden. 48 Despite the age of the opinion ( Baker v.  Selden dates from 1880),  Baker 
was a primary focus of the Supreme Court’s questions during oral argument in 
 Lotus , 49 and confl icting views of  Baker stood at the core of the Federal Circuit’s 
 Oracle opinion and of the  Oracle defendant’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. As will 
appear below, Baker makes important rulings on copyrightability, but it also provides 
a new avenue (outside issues of copyrightability) for handling some software cases. 
 11.2.1.  An Irony 
 Before examining the new avenue, let us note the parallel way the Federal Circuit 
handled the issue of protectable subject-matter in another area. In trademark law, 
“functional” shapes are ineligible for trade dress protection, for the same reasons 
of patent-deference that limits the reach of copyright. 50 Defi ning “functionality” 
 44  Oracle II, 750 F.3d at 1361,  cert. denied , 135 S. Ct. 2887 (June 29, 2015) (No. 14–410),  available at  www.
supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/062915zor_4g25.pdf . 
 45  Petition for Certiorari,  Google, Inc. v. Oracle America, Inc. , 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014), 83 U.S.L.W. 
3240 at i. (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14–410), 2014 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4113. 
 46  Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, 49 F.3d 807, 816–7 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 47  Oracle II at 1355. 
 48  Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880). (Much of the secondary literature gives the opinion’s date as 1879. 
Although the case was argued in 1879, the opinion came down in 1880). 
 49  The oral argument is available at  www.oyez.org/cases/1990–1999/1995/1995_94_2003 
 50  The core of trademark law is “distinctiveness as to source.” Protection for product shapes on the 
ground of “distinctiveness” is called “trade dress.” No form of trade dress protection is permitted for 
functional confi gurations. 15 U.S.C. § 1227 (2012); see also Qualitex v. Jacobson Products, 514 U.S. 
159 (1995) (“The functionality doctrine . . . forbids the use of a product’s feature as a trademark where 
doing so will put a competitor at a signifi cant disadvantage because the feature is “essential to the use 
or purpose of the article” or “affects its cost or quality.” [citing  Inwood Labs v. Ives Labs , 456 U.S. 844, 
851, fn. 10 (1982)]”). 
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has of course been the subject of much litigation. The U.S. Supreme Court in 
 TrafFix v.  MDI 51 ruled that the availability of alternative product shapes could 
 not “save” an otherwise functional shape from being unsuitable subject matter 
for trademark ownership. 52 The Federal Circuit responded to  TrafFix essentially 
by taking evasive maneuver saving questionable trademark rights in functional 
product shapes by re-introducing “the availability of alternatives.” 53 
 So when in  Oracle the Federal Circuit took the same route as it had in trademark – 
validating nonpatent rights over functional subject matter by asking “are alternatives 
possible?” – it perhaps should not have been surprising. The chapter will suggest 
that much as the Federal Circuit attempted to evade the full import of the Supreme 
Court’s  TrafFix opinion for functionality in trademark law, the Federal Circuit in 
 51  TrafFix Devices v. Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
 52  Id. at 25. 
  The Fifth Circuit case  Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz Gmbh v. Ritter Gmbh well illustrates the  TrafFix 
approach. In Eppendorf, a syringe had a fl ange that was supported against deformation by a 
particular design for fi ns. The plaintiff sought trade dress protection for the fi ns as distinctive and 
nonfunctional trade dress, relying on expert testimony indicating that many different fi n designs – 
many alternatives – could have supported the fl ange. The particular design was nevertheless held 
ineligible for trademark protection. Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz Gmbh v. Ritter Gmbh, 289 F.3d 351, 
357–8 (5th Cir. 2002)  (“Eppendorf’s experts concede that fi ns  of some shape, size or number  are 
necessary to provide support for the fl ange and to prevent deformation of the product. . . .  [T] hey are 
functional as a matter of law.  TrafFix , 532 U.S. at 33–4.”) (Emphasis added.) The juridical irrelevance 
of alternative fl ange designs could not be more obvious. 
   Copyright uses a similar approach in the “separability” hurdle that useful three-dimensional articles 
must surmount in order to obtain copyright. Thus, when the Second Circuit denied copyright to 
sculpted mannequins used for clothing displays, the court did not ask whether the sculpted torsos 
could have been shaped differently. Instead, the Court looked at the shapes as they existed. Since 
all the elements served a function, no elements survived the separability inquiry. Thus, despite the 
obvious possibility of sculpting torsos differently, there was nothing to which a copyright could attach:
 [T] he features claimed to be aesthetic or artistic, e.g., the life-size confi guration of the breasts 
and the width of the shoulders, are inextricably intertwined with the utilitarian feature, the 
display of clothes. [A] model of a human torso, in order to serve its utilitarian function, must 
have some confi guration of the chest and some width of shoulders. . . 
  Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 1985). Although courts 
vary in their defi nitions of “separability,” no court will give copyright to a useful product shape simply 
because alternative shapes exist. One court seems to be fl irting with including some consideration of 
alternatives into “separability,” Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 931 (7th 
Cir. 2004), but even that court’s dominant inquiry is not “alternatives.” Its focus is on the degree to 
which the design process was free of “utilitarian pressures.” 
  The separability test – more demanding than the “merger” test that also denies copyright to works 
of authorship – is mandated by the defi nition of sculptural works in the statute. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(2012) (defi nition of “pictorial, graphic and sculptural works”). 
 53  See Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002). See 1-2A  Gilson on 
Trademarks § 2A.04 (“The Federal Circuit believes its pre- TrafFix test is still good law and continues 
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 Oracle now attempts to evade the full import of the Supreme Court’s  Baker opinion 
for functionality in copyright. 
 11.3.  Copyright Uses and Patent Uses:  BAKER  V.   SELDEN 
 11.3.1.  Introducing  Baker v. Selden 
 As mentioned, the core Supreme Court case on functional use of copyrighted works 
is  Baker v.  Selden. 54 Relied on both by the  Lotus  55 and  Oracle decisions, 56 the case 
involved the copying of accounting forms. 
 Selden’s widow and administratrix, as plaintiff, asserted copyright in a number of 
books that both explained and illustrated the decedent’s supposedly novel method of 
bookkeeping. The Selden method enabled an accountant to use fewer volumes and 
work more expeditiously. Baker was alleged to have copied accounting forms from 
Selden’s books. Baker’s forms differed somewhat from Selden’s, but the litigants’ 
focus was not on how similar or different the forms might have been. Rather, their 
focus was on whether Baker’s forms enabled accountants to reach the same practical 
results via the same system as did Selden’s. 57 
 The Supreme Court was concerned lest copyright allow an end-run around the 
requirements imposed by patent law. Patents are secured only by prior review and 
must be registered to give the public notice of their content; copyrights arise without 
either necessity. Patents last a short time; copyrights remain assertable for decades 
longer. Patents are supposed to issue only upon passing rigorous tests of novelty and 
nonobviousness; copyrights arise in virtually any doodle, letter home from camp, or 
amateur recording of street noise. In now-classic language, the Court wrote:
 To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the art described therein, 
when no examination of its novelty has ever been offi cially made, would be a surprise 
and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of letters-patent, not of copyright. . . . 
The description of the art in a book, though entitled to the benefi t of copyright, 
lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself. The object of the one is 
explanation; the object of the other is use. The former may be secured by copyright. 
The latter can only be secured, if it can be secured at all, by letters patent. 58 
to use its  Morton-Norwich analysis that recognizes evidence of alternative designs as “part of the 
overall mix. . . . The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board follows the Federal Circuit  . . . ”). 
 54  Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880). 
 55  Baker v. Selden is discussed both by the majority, 49 F.3d 807 at 813–17, and by the concurrence, 49 
F.3d 807 at 819. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995) aff’d, 516 U.S. 233 
(1996). 
 56  Oracle II, 750 F.3d at 1355-7. 
 57  Baker , 101 U.S. at 101 (“The evidence of the complainant is principally directed to the object of 
showing that Baker uses the same system as that which is explained and illustrated in  Selden’s books.”). 
 58  Id. at 102, 105. 
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 So the functional system or other useful art could not be copyrighted, even though 
copyright could subsist in the textual explanation or pictorial illustration of the art. 
 But this conclusion did not necessarily leave a work with functional goals without 
copyright altogether. A  copyright might lose its force as against some forms of 
copying and yet retain its force against others. The kind of use makes a difference: a 
diagram that is a “necessary incident” to a system can be used freely by the public 
for “purposes of practical application” but not “for the purpose of publication in 
other works explanatory of the art.” 59 This distinction has become known as the “use/
explanation” doctrine. 60 
 The best-known result of the  Baker Court’s concern with keeping copyright 
from interfering with patent law was  Baker’s holding that systems could not be 
copyrightable. But copyrightability is only one of copyright’s dimensions; another 
is the nature of the “exclusive rights” a copyright owner is granted. 61  Baker v. Selden 
operated in both dimensions: the opinion posited that even when a valid copyright 
existed, deference to patent would place limits on the scope of a copyright owner’s 
rights. 62 That second aspect of  Baker , the aspect dealing not with copyrightability 
but with scope of right, is this chapter’s main topic. 
 Baker and its progeny distinguish between two types of behaviors that employ 
created works: uses that are suitable for copyright regulation, and uses that should be 
regulated solely by patent law.  Baker’s ruling that copyright owners do not have the 
same rights to control each type 63 of behavior provides another avenue for examining 
copying in suits like  Oracle v.  Google . This new avenue focuses on limiting a 
copyright owner’s rights over functional use rather than on denying copyright to 
functional subject matter. 64 
 59  Id. at 103. The Court writes, similarly, that, “[W] hilst no one has a right to print or publish his book, or 
any material part thereof, as a book intended to convey instruction in the art, any person may practise 
and use the art itself which he has described and illustrated therein. . . . And, of course, in using the 
art, the ruled lines and headings of accounts must necessarily be used as incident to it.”  Id . at 104. 
 60  As the reader may have noticed, the name of the doctrine comes from a portion of the opinion that is 
a bit inapposite, as the portion focuses more on copyrightability than on the scope of exclusive right: 
 The description of the art in a book, though entitled to the benefi t of copyright, lays no 
foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself. The object of the one is explanation; the 
object of the other is use. The former may be secured by copyright. The latter can only be 
secured, if it can be secured at all, by letters-patent.  Baker v. Selden , 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1880). 
 61  Copyright has essentially three dimensions: duration (has the copyright expired?), subject matter (is 
the work original, fi xed in a tangible medium, and a protectable type of authorship?), and exclusive 
right (is the defendant accused of a behavior over which the copyright owner has an exclusive right?) 
 62  There is an identity between the “rights” of the owner and the “uses” that the owner controls. See 
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (granting to copyright owner exclusive rights to control use of the work via 
reproduction, use of the work via public performance, use of the work via public display, and so on). 
 63  Baker , 101 U.S. at 102. 
 64  At the risk of blurring defi nitional boundaries, it should be noted that many subject-matter questions 
can be stated in terms of exclusive rights, and vice versa. For example, one could say, equally, that 
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 At fi rst glance, this approach from  Baker may seem as broad in its impact as the 
 Lotus decision that held a computer program’s command structures uncopyrightable. 
However, as this chapter shows below, the approach need not imperil the overall 
copyrightability of computer programs, and would not eliminate all ability of 
computer-program copyright owners to bring suit against economically signifi cant 
use. 65 The “rights” approach from  Baker instead draws some helpful lines – and note 
that the approach has nothing to do with “alternatives,” which had been key to the 
 Oracle court’s decision in favor of plaintiff. 
 11.3.2.  Signifi cance 
 Had the Supreme Court in  Baker v. Selden enabled copyright owners to control 
functional uses of the utilitarian systems or devices their copyrighted works portray, 
a welter of unregistered private rights lasting far longer than patents and easier to 
obtain than patents would be awarded over utilitarian subject matters regardless 
of whether they met patentable standards.  Baker v. Selden marks the place where 
resistance to the confl uence of patent and copyright law fi rst took mature form. 66 
 Prior to that 1880 decision, designers of systems who could somehow ground those 
systems in graphic art had plausible claims to copyright. For example, some years 
before  Baker¸ a case arose involving copyright in dressmaker patterns. 67 (Dressmaker 
patterns are two-dimensional paper drawings meant to be pinned on fabric to guide a 
tailor’s shears.) 68 The plaintiff successfully enjoined unauthorized garment patterns 
that, though not identical, achieved the “same result” in terms of producing the 
same fi nished clothing. 69 
“systems are not copyrightable” or that “copyright owners have no right to control the functional 
copying of their systems.” 
   The point at issue in this chapter is whether Baker can allow the public to engage in some functional 
use of a program (say, uses which are “purely” nonexpressive) while allowing the computer program 
author to retain copyright control over other uses. 
   It’s easy to interpret Baker as requiring complete denial of copyright -- after all, the opinion does 
say, “The conclusion to which we have come is, that blank account-books are not the subject of 
copyright.”  Baker , 101 U.S. at, 107. But much of the opinion leans toward a less sweeping invalidation. 
 65  This fear was expressed by the Oracle II court. Oracle II, 750 F.3d at 1361. 
 66  In my analysis of  Baker , I  am indebted to the work of Abraham Drassinower, particularly his 
book Abraham Drassinower, What’s Wrong with Copying? (Harvard University Press, 2015) 
[hereinafter Drassinower], and the work of Pamela Samuelson, particularly  Pamela  Samuelson , 
 Frontiers of Intellectual Property: Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the Scope 
of Its Protection ,  85  Tex. L. Rev.  1921 (hereinafter “Systems and Processes”); and  Pamela  Samuelson , 
 Baker v.  Selden:  Sharpening the Distinction between Authorship and Invention ,  in  Intellectual 
Property Stories ( Jane C.  Ginsburg and  Rochelle Cooper  Dreyfuss , eds.,  2006 ). 
 67  Drury v. Ewing, 7 F. Cas. 1113 (C.C.S.D. 1862). 
 68    Id. 
 69    Id . 
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 In 1880, that changed. After  Baker v. Selden , courts continually rejected efforts 
to argue that similarity in system and practical result 70 could justify a judgment of 
copyright infringement. 71 
 11.3.3.  Baker and “merger” 
 The “merger” doctrine aims to preserve the public’s liberty to use abstract ideas 
by preventing copyright from arising in a work of expression that is one of very 
few ways to convey the abstraction. If few or no alternative forms exist, then the 
particular form of expression is said to “merge” with the unprotectable idea, and 
the expression too becomes incapable of being owned under copyright law. 
 “Merger” is a troublesome doctrine, but it has some legitimacy when employed 
to keep copyright from locking up general and abstract ideas. The  Oracle court 
took “merger” and applied it instead to functional innovation. Because the 
contested elements of the Java program could have been written in alternative 
ways, the Federal Circuit held, those elements were capable of sustaining a 
copyright. 72 
 The Federal Circuit is not alone in using the possibility of alternatives to 
justify giving nonpatent protection to a functional innovation. Yet the application 
of “merger” in such contexts is neither mandated nor explicitly approved by any 
legislation, and no court has articulated a clear rationale for taking the step. 
 Further, much U.S.  legislation and precedent would seem to weigh against 
seeing “merger” and its inquiry into “alternatives” as an appropriate tool for defi ning 
appropriate borders between copyright and patent law. For example, consider the 
requirements for protection in the law of utility patent. Patent applicants must 
show “utility,” “novelty,” and “nonobviousness,” but applicants need not prove that 
 70  After discussing various similarities and differences in appearance, as between plaintiff’s work and 
defendant’s, the court in  Drury opined:
 But there is one fact that seems wholly conclusive on this question of identity, and dispenses 
with the necessity of a minute inquiry into the alleged discrepancies between the two plans. 
Some nine or ten witnesses, practical and intelligent dressmakers, well acquainted with the 
theory and practice of taking measurements, and cutting dresses upon the plan of these parties, 
testify that the two are substantially the same, and  in practice produce the same result. Some of 
these witnesses swear they have cut dresses by both plans, and that when the directions of each 
are strictly pursued, the results are substantially the same. 
 . . . Mrs. Ewing has, with some adroitness, so arranged and transposed some parts of Mrs. Drury’s 
diagrams as to present to the unexperienced eye the impression that they are dissimilar, but in 
doing this she has utterly failed to prove that there is any difference  in the principle of the two. 
 Drury , 7 F. Cas. at 1117 (emphasis added). 
 71  See, e.g., the cases reviewed  infra at notes 113–119. 
 72  Oracle II at 1361. 
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their invention is superior to other ways of accomplishing a goal. 73 The presence 
of “alternatives” does not doom eligibility for federal patent protection. 
 Patents exist in many different riding lawn-mowers, for example, without any 
of the manufacturers needing to prove that their own mower possesses elements 
so unique that no other product can serve as an adequate alternative. Sometimes, 
therefore, simply being different can suffi ce for a patent. 74 
 This is a sensible decision for Congress to have made. Judgments of product 
superiority or uniqueness are vulnerable, 75 ,  76 and characteristics that make an 
innovation merely different today might make it uniquely important later. Monetary 
value, for example, is largely a matter of context, so that price and cost attributable to 
varying combinations of elements will alter over time as constraints and needs alter. 
 From the fact that Congress permits patents to be granted in innovations that 
have alternatives, it would seem to follow that such innovations have at least some 
signifi cance. If so, it is quite arguable that the law should avoid undermining 
innovators’ willingness to embrace the costly patent system (with its rigorous 
standards, disclosure requirements, and short duration) for such innovations. The 
patent system loses much of its appeal if an innovator can bypass it to employ a 
regime like copyright. (Although an owner’s rights under copyright are a bit less 
strong than an owner’s rights under patent law, copyright is still tempting: 77 copyrights 
 73  See, e.g., 1–4  Chisum on Patents § 4.01 (2015) (“To comply with the utility requirement, an 
invention need not be superior to existing products or processes.”). 
 74  Some qualifi cations are in order. For example, in determining whether or not an innovation is nonobvious, 
courts sometimes used to look to secondary evidence such as whether others in the fi eld have long failed 
to “solve the problem.”  Id. at § 5.05. Other secondary criteria include, inter alia, length of unmet need, 
or (most controversially) the presence of commercial success.  Id. As a matter of logic, an innovation with 
no existing alternatives will do better on measures such as “unmet need” and “unsolved problem” than 
can an innovation that already has alternatives on the market. Similarly, an innovation that may not have 
alternatives on the market now, but for which potential alternatives can be easily imagined, may well fare 
poorly on measures such as commercial success. The presence of actual or potential alternatives may, 
therefore, make some kind of difference to the likelihood that a patent will be awarded. 
 75  Thus, the Tenth Circuit argues:
 [T] he framers of the patent system did not require an inventor to demonstrate an invention’s 
superiority to existing products in order to qualify for a patent. That they did not do so tells us 
that the patent system seeks not only superior inventions but also a multiplicity of inventions. 
A variety of choices is more likely to satisfy the desires of a greater number of consumers than 
is a single set of products deemed “optimal” in some average sense by patent examiners and/
or judges. And the ability to intermingle and extrapolate from many inventors’ solutions to the 
same problem is more likely to lead to further technological advances than is a single, linear 
approach seeking to advance one “superior” line of research and development. 
 76  Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1508 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied , 
516 U.S. 1067 (1996). 
 77  Some readers may object that this should be parsed more closely. They might point out, for example, 
that the Supreme Court has indicated that, for innovations clearly ineligible for patents, allowing 
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are granted for immensely long terms of private control, are largely free of required 
requirement of disclosure, 78 and arise under fairly easy standards of acquisition.) In 
addition, many of Congress’s decisions, such as the patent rule that only “novel” and 
“nonobvious” functional innovations should be privatized, 79 will be disregarded if 
courts uphold copyrights in common and obvious functional variations. 
Patent Law Is a Jealous Monarch 
 In several cases construing the pre-emptive reach of federal patent law, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has stated that a functional confi guration that is known to the 
public and is unprotected by utility patent or design patent  should not be able to 
fi nd protection under the wings of nonpatent regimes. 80 Functional products that 
patent law does not protect (whether because a product fails to meet standards such 
as nonobviousness or novelty, 81 or because its patent has expired 82 ) become governed 
by the patent public domain, and in that domain, patent law gives rights “to copy 
states to provide alternative routes to privatization would reduce neither the number of federal patent 
applications nor the amount of disclosure produced by the federal patent system. Kewanee Oil Co. 
v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485 (1974) (refusing to pre-empt state trade secrecy law).  Kewanee ’s 
logic is, however, questionable on its own terms and inapplicable here.One of the diffi culties with 
Kewanee ’s interior logic is the real possibility that diminishing the level of disclosure produced by 
the patent offi ce might be a lesser problem than the impairment of free competition resulting from 
nonpatent protection. If so, asking how state protections would impact on the number of federal patent 
applicants would be beside the main point.More importantly for this chapter is that  Kewanee ’s focus 
on the differential likelihoods of patenting various innovations is largely irrelevant to the “merger” 
search for alternatives. Whether or not an innovation has alternatives does not directly correlate with 
whether or not the innovation could obtain a federal utility patent. 
 78  All patent applications must disclose their inventions. Copyright Offi ce regulations, by contrast, 
allow the registrants of computer software to hide most of the code from public view. See, e.g.,  U.S. 
Copyright Office, Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices § 1509.1(C)(4)(b) (3d 
ed. 2014) (Computer Programs That Contain Trade Secret Material). 
 79  The dangers of too much privatization include, inter alia, excessive deadweight loss, and this cost 
applies to innovations whether or not they are potentially patentable. 
 80  At fi rst the courts spoke as if patent and copyright were to be given similarly broad pre-emptive effect. 
See, e.g., Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 367 U.S. 234, 238 (1964) (“when an article is 
unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law may not forbid others to copy that article”). Over 
time, however, the patent and copyright cases were given different treatment. Although in many 
areas the patent statute was understood to have drawn “a balance” between protection and public 
domain to which states were required to defer, the 1909 Copyright Act by contrast was interpreted as 
leaving signifi cant topics as to which “Congress has drawn no balance.” Goldstein v. California, 412 
U.S. 570–1 (1973) (declining to pre-empt California provision that prohibited the copying of sound 
recordings). 
 81  Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 226, n.1 (1964) (reiterating a District Court fi nding 
that Stiffel’s lamp patent was “invalid for want of invention” – a holding that Stiffel did not challenge 
on appeal). 
 82  TrafFix Devices v. Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23, 25 (2001) (confi guration for which trade dress protection 
was sought had been previously protected by patent). 
9781107132375c11_p319-372.indd   335 4/5/2016   7:55:37 PM
Wendy J. Gordon336
and to use.” 83 It is as if patent law were a monarch who has declared that any product 
she has freed must remain free of subordinate sovereigns as well. 
 To crown patent law the chief monarch over functionality makes considerable 
sense. Federal copyright 84 and federal trademark law 85 both contain provisions that 
 decline to protect functional innovations and designs. Moreover, it is in the patent 
statutes that Congress seems to have embodied its most attentive consideration to 
questions of how functional innovations should be treated. 
 I concede that this “jealous monarch” view of patent law is not unanimously held, 
particularly in regard to patent/copyright relations. First, the Supremacy Clause 
undergirds the pre-emption cases, and the Clause is irrelevant to interactions 
between two federal regimes like copyright and patent. 86 Second, the copyright 
and trademark statutes have been interpreted in various ways, sometimes but not 
consistently hostile to courts that inquire into a functional product’s “alternatives” 87 
en route to deciding whether or not to allow nonpatent protection. So the monarchal 
view of patent law does not reign unopposed within courts interpreting its sister 
statutes. Third, pre-emption cases themselves fl uctuate in the strength they attribute 
to patent’s public domain. 88 
 Nevertheless, the pre-emption cases have a clear central line of argument, and 
the federal statutes for both copyright and trademark consistently defer to patent 
law for reasons best explained (in terms of both logic and history) by the same 
 83  Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 153 (1989) (quoting Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite 
Lighting, Inc., 367 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).) 
 84  In the copyright statute, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) puts systems, methods of operation, and processes 
fully outside copyright protection; in other provisions (such as § 113(b), or the defi nition of PGS 
work in § 101), the statute actively prevents copyrights from arising, or deprives copyright owners of 
otherwise-applicable rights, where copyright could interfere with patent law’s public domain. 
 85  Under the federal Lanham Act, trademarks cannot be functional; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e), 1125(a) 
(3)  (2012). The language is not self-defi ning, however; many courts distinguish between “de jure 
functionality,” which permits protection under the Lanham Act, and “de facto” functionality that just 
happens to exist. The Supreme Court’s most recent opinion on the topic, TrafFix Devices v. Mktg. 
Displays , 532 U.S. 23 (2001), sensibly ignores the labels of de jure and de facto functionality, and in 
so doing seems to unite the two categories. The  TrafFix Court held that the possibility of alternative 
product shapes could not justify giving federal trade dress protection to a shape that was otherwise 
functional.  Id.  at 25. 
 86  Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989) (Florida statute prohibiting certain 
modes of copying boat designs  held inconsistent with the patent public domain and thus pre-empted 
by the Supremacy Clause). 
 87  The Supreme Court has criticized using an inquiry into “alternatives” to decide whether a product 
shape is ineligible for protection under federal trademark law,  TrafFix Devices v. Mktg. Displays , 532 
U.S. 23 (2001), and the Federal Circuit has resisted. See Section 11.2.1,  supra. 
 88  Compare, for example, the breadth of pre-emptive sweep in Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 
Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (pre-empting state protection for certain trade dress) with the convoluted 
logic of Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp, 416 U.S. 470, 485 (1974) (not pre-empting state protection 
for trade secrets). 
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approach: namely, that only through patent law should duties be imposed that require 
the public not to duplicate or sell innovative functional products. After all, nonpatent 
laws that privatize intellectual products have potential to undermine patent law’s 
balance between competition and monopoly whether the laws are federal or state. 
 In the pre-emption area, at least one classic case makes it clear that state 
protection is forbidden not only for unique advances, but also for products that have 
alternatives. Thus, the Supreme Court wrote:
 That an article copied from an unpatented article could be made in some other 
way, that the design is . . . not essential to the use of either article, . . . that there 
may be “confusion” among purchasers as to which article is which or as to who 
is the maker, may be relevant evidence in applying a State’s law requiring such 
precautions as labeling; however, and regardless of the copier’s motives, neither 
these facts nor any others can furnish a basis for imposing liability for or prohibiting 
the actual acts of copying and selling. 89 
 This approach to the patent public domain leaves no room for a doctrine like 
“merger.” 
 Conceivably, a justifi cation could be constructed for restricting the logic of the 
pre-emption cases to assessing solely the validity of state laws. The justifi cation might 
also stretch to defending the practice of courts’ employing “merger” to justify privatizing 
functional but unpatented products under federal copyright and federal trademark 
laws. Perhaps one could argue, for example, that patent law’s public domain should 
defer more to cognate federal laws (such as federal copyright and federal trademark) 
than it does to states’ attempts to create intellectual property. But such an argument 
would need to go much further than pointing out that the Supremacy Clause has no 
purchase over intrafederal relations; such a formalistic reply would ignore the fact that 
when  either federal  or state law grants exclusivity in functional products outside of 
patent, those grants can have very serious real-world effects. 
 In sum: patent law makes nothing turn on the difference between innovations 
that have alternatives and those that do not, and copyright and trademark states 
both defer to patent law. Therefore it should at least surprise us when a court 
allows copyright or trademark claims to arise in an original or distinctive functional 
product simply because the product passes something like a “merger” test of having 
 89  Compco Corp. v.  Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964). The Supreme Court has 
admittedly withdrawn from some of the statements in  Compco and its companion case Sears, Roebuck 
& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). In my view the later cases do not impair the core policy of 
requiring other laws to respect patent law’s limits on protection. The most diffi cult case for my position 
is Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp, 416 U.S. 470 (1974), but its result is explicable: I think that in 
 Kewanee trade secrecy survived the pre-emption attack for reasons not rooted in logic but in practical 
administration of the law: it was obvious that Congress had not intended to create such a signifi cant 
disruption in local commercial law. 
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competitive alternatives. But that is what the  Oracle court did, and it is what other 
courts sometimes do as well. 
 The historic origins of this practice cannot be fully untangled here. Nevertheless 
the instant chapter does hope to accomplish two things. The fi rst goal is to make 
vivid why it is problematic for courts to use the search for alternatives as if it were a 
sensible or natural tool – one that needs no explanation or justifi cation – to resolve 
tensions between patent law and other cognate doctrines. I hope that goal has been 
accomplished. 
 The second goal is to make clear that the legal community should stop attributing 
to  Baker the mess that is “merger.” It is to that task that the chapter now turns. 
 Baker v. Selden neither gave birth to, nor legitimates, the use of “merger” 
in the context of functionality 
 Some jurists, perhaps including some on the Federal Circuit, 90 see  Baker v. Selden 
as the foundation for “merger.” But that reading blurs the line between “abstract 
ideas” (which merger addresses) and “functional systems” (which are addressed 
by  Baker and a host of “useful article” and “functionality” doctrines). Regarding 
abstract ideas, copyright puts them in the public domain for virtually all purposes, 
but as for systems and methods of operation, copyright “channels” them toward 
patent law. 91 Under  Baker , patent law and its “rights to copy and to use” 92 unpatented 
innovations seem to have a particularly strong magnetic force. 
 Admittedly, the  Baker v. Selden opinion contains language about the “necessity” 
of using Selden’s forms – language that some have interpreted as the Court assuming 
that few alternative accounting forms would do the job. But the relevant passage is 
not a fi nding of fact, and is best explicable on purely rhetorical grounds. 93 More 
 90  Oracle II, 750 F.3d at 1355. 
 91  For a useful discussion of pitfalls and opportunities in current methods of channeling IP producers 
to different legal doctrines, see  Mark P.  McKenna ,  An Alternate Approach to Channeling? ,  51  Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev .  873 ( 2009 ). 
 92  This language, while applicable in spirit, I quote from a case decided much later than  Baker . Bonito 
Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 164–5 (1989). 
 93  It is true that the  Baker opinion said that “where the art [that a book] teaches cannot be used without 
employing the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are similar to them, such 
methods and diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given therewith 
to the public.” Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1880). That language is sometimes interpreted to 
indicate that the Court believed that few or no alternatives existed to the plaintiff’s accounting form. 
But that language was  not a factual fi nding . 
   Rather, it was a reply to the earlier claim by plaintiff’s lawyer that his client owned the system 
precisely because (he alleged) the forms were necessary to the system’s use. (“It is contended [by 
plaintiff] that he has secured such exclusive right because no one can use the system without using 
substantially the same ruled lines and headings which he was appended to his books in illustration of 
it. In other words, it is contended that the ruled lines and headings, given to illustrate the system, are 
a part of the book, and as such are secured by the copyright, and that no one can make or use similar 
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importantly, the same passage indicates that even “necessary” forms  will be infringed 
when they are copied in “publication in other works explanatory of the art.” 94 The 
passage therefore is not addressing copyrightability at all. 
 Whether or not the “merger” doctrine is capable of safeguarding the public 
domain status of abstract ideas, abstract ideas were not the Court’s concern in 
 Baker . As intimated above, abstract ideas and patentable inventions lie outside 
copyright for non-identical sets of reasons. The  Baker Court’s concern was to keep 
an overgenerous application of copyright law from undermining inventors’ reasons 
to seek the protection of patent law. Congress had not chosen copyright (with its 
long term and ease of acquisition) to govern functional innovation; Congress gave 
that task to patent law, a realm marked by short duration, requirements of disclosure, 
and high standards that a government agent needed to be persuaded were satisfi ed. 95 
 
 11.4.  Defining “Explanation” and “Use” 
 The discussion to this point has suggested that, under  Baker , the owners of copyright 
in literary and graphic works cannot employ their rights to control all forms of copying. 
Some copying is functional, and lies within the public’s freedom of action unless 
restrained by some law other than copyright. Thus a copyright owner can have rights 
against some copying but not others: A liberty to copy can be given the public “for the 
purpose of practical application. . . .,” 96 while, by contrast, copying done “for the purpose 
of publication in other works explanatory of the art” 97 could result in infringement. 
This dichotomy between infringing and noninfringing uses 98 has of course become 
known as the “use/explanation” distinction. 
ruled lines and headings, or ruled lines and headings made and arranged on substantially the same 
system, without violating the copyright.”  Id. at 101). 
   As I see it, the Court was merely turning the copyright claimant’s rhetoric on its head. The claimant’s 
lawyer had pointed to an alleged interdependence of the accounting system and the accounting 
forms. The lawyer had argued that the forms (a set of drawings) were necessary to the system, and that 
therefore the drawings’ eligibility for copyright should make copyright apply to the system as well. The 
Court replied in kind. If such interdependence existed, the Court ruled, such that the drawings were 
necessary to the system, then it was the system’s ineligibility for copyright that would apply to both. 
   For other reasons why the “merger” interpretation of Baker is incorrect, the best guide is Pamela 
Samuelson, whose scholarship is cited throughout below. 
 94  Baker , 101 U.S. at 103. 
 95  Id . at 102. 
 96  Id . at 103. 
 97  Id. 
 98  This dichotomy could be equivalently expressed. Where an owner has rights against copying, the 
public has duties not to copy (for “duties” are correlative to “rights”); where an owner lacks rights 
against copying, the public has a privilege or liberty to copy (for liberties are correlative to an absence 
of exclusive right in opposing parties). This vocabulary, which can be quite useful, fi nds its origin 
with Hohfeld.  Wesley N.  Hohfeld ,  Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning and Other Legal Essays ( 1919 ). 
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 The “use/explanation” nomenclature is fairly unhelpful.  Everything done with 
a copyrighted work is in some sense a “use,” so the “use” half of the term is less a 
description than a gesture: a hand waved toward the realm of utility patents. As for the 
other half of the phrase, “explanation,” copying for explanation is obviously exemplary 
rather than exhaustive of the many kinds of copying behavior that copyright law can 
legitimately regulate. Scholars sometimes use the term “nonfunctional” to label the 
behaviors that copyright can regulate without imperilling patent law. (This chapter also 
sometimes employs “nonfunctional” in this way.) 
 But “nonfunctional,” too, is mere term-of-art shorthand and, in the end, inaccurate 
in the context of ordinary language. Behaviors unquestionably within copyright’s 
legitimate sphere (such as copying a work verbatim into one’s blog) can serve “functions” 
such as educating one’s readers, or advertising one’s own skills, that are as important as 
many “functions” served by patented inventions. 
 So what are the behaviors beyond “explanation” that can properly be controlled by 
copyright?  Baker has some suggestive answers, as does the contemporary copyright statute. 
 First, regarding literary or graphic works that convey the “teachings of science,” 
 Baker tells us that it is only use of the  expressive aspect that copyright can enforce. When 
scientifi c and practical teachings are 
 embodied and taught in a literary composition or book, their essence consists only in 
 their statement. This alone is what is secured by the copyright. The use by another of 
the same methods of statement, whether in words or illustrations, in a book published 
for teaching the art would undoubtedly be an infringement of the copyright. 99 
 Legislative history tells us that Congress considered “expressiveness” the basis for 
copyright even for computer programs. 100 So a use on the copyright side of the line is a 
use that draws on the expressive aspects of a work. 
 99  Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1880) (emphasis added). 
 100  When Congress adopted copyright for computer programs, expressiveness was key. To quote from the 
legislative history, using emphasis supplied by the Oracle I court:
 Some concern has been expressed lest copyright in computer programs should extend protection 
to the methodology or processes adopted by the programmer, rather than merely to the “writing” 
expressing his ideas. Section 102(b) is intended, among other things, to make clear that  the expression 
adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer program , and that  the actual 
processes or methods embodied in the program are not within the scope of the copyright law. 
 Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or contracts the scope of copyright protection under the 
present law. Its purpose is to restate, in the context of the new single Federal system of copyright, 
that the basic dichotomy between expression and idea remains unchanged. 
 H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 56–7 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 House Rep.] (emphasis added)  available at 
 www.copyright.gov/history/law/clrev_94–1976.pdf . 
  Oracle I, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 986 (emphasis altered; footnote omitted). 
  This reliance on expressiveness also appears in the rationale for the 1980 amendments. The 
recommendations on which Congress relied in 1980 depended on the division between “the 
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 The  Baker opinion also provides some helpful examples. Not only can copyright 
infringement result from copying for “publication in other works explanatory of 
the art”, 101 the Court tells us; infringement also can arise as a result of copying the 
“lines of the poet or the historian’s periods” 102 and from copying works of authorship 
whose only goal is to serve aesthetic “taste” 103 or the “production of pleasure in the 
contemplation” of “form.” 104 
 So it does not count as utilitarian “use” to produce pleasure through aesthetics 
and contemplation. To produce pleasure through designing a tickling machine 
would be another story. 
 It can be as diffi cult to defi ne what counts as a patent-type “use” as it was to defi ne 
a copyright-type “explanation.” Yet it is important to identify what kinds of purposes 
(described with whatever specifi city is possible) might suffi ce to activate patent’s 
magnetic force so strongly that patent’s infl uence makes an act of reproduction 
noninfringing under copyright law. 
 We might start by distinguishing expressive from nonexpressive uses. 105 However, 
 Baker does not address all nonexpressive uses;  Baker addresses only one subset, 
namely, copying behavior that lies within the domain of patent law’s proper concern. 
Does patent law provide answers? Unfortunately not; patent law’s notion of “utility” is 
too vague to assist and hardly self-defi ning. Is there some other source of criteria for 
copyrightable element of  style and expression in a computer program and the process which underlies 
it.”  Final Report of the National Commission on New Technology Uses of Copyrighted 
Works (1978) at 22 [hereinafter CONTU]. In 1980, Congress essentially adopted the CONTU 
recommendations. 
 101  Baker , 101 U.S. at 104–5. 
 102  Id. at 104. 
  Robert Bone has suggested that the  Baker court was trying to distinguish between different  kinds of 
works – those susceptible only to expression-oriented behaviors of the kinds with which copyright has 
traditionally been concerned, and those works that are susceptible to functional application of the 
kinds with which that patent law has traditionally been concerned. It is possible that, as Professor Bone 
suggests, the Court may be making a teleological subject-matter distinction here, namely, that works 
of a particular type (poetry, history, pictures “addressed to the taste”) simply have no conceivable 
“functions” or “uses” about which patent law should be concerned. But even so, the Court’s root 
concern would seem to be with types of use. 
   One need not go so far as to eliminate copyrightability in order to shelter the public’s freedom to 
use functional aspects of a copyrighted work in a functional way. 
 103  Baker , 101 U.S. at 104. 
 104  The Court noted, “[T] hese observations are not intended to apply to ornamental designs, or pictorial 
illustrations addressed to the taste. Of these it may be said, that their form is their essence, and their 
object, the production of pleasure in their contemplation.”  Baker , 101 U.S. at 103–4. 
 105  By contrast, Abraham Drassinower’s view of  Baker does begin with a distinction between communicative 
and non-communicative use. See, e.g., Abraham Drassinower,  Copyright Infringement as Compelled 
Speech , Section III, Philosophy and Intellectual Property (Anabelle Lever, ed., Cambridge University 
Press, 2012); see also the discussion  infra accompanying  note 126 and the sources cited therein. 
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identifying patent-type “use,” or for identifying (something not quite its converse) the 
kind of “use” for which copyright is not the proper regulator? 
 One potential source is the contemporary statutory concept of “useful article.” 106 It 
appears in the 1976 Copyright Act. 
 Coming into the mid-seventies, Congress was considering the latest of a series of 
copyright reform bills. When the House received the bill containing what soon became the 
new Copyright Act, part of the bill (“Title II”) was a set of sui generis rules granting design 
protection for “applied art” such as the attractive design of autos, appliances, and furniture. 
The House jettisoned Title II. It did so in part because of concerns about monopoly. 107 
 The entitlements given by Copyright are even stronger than the sui generis right that 
Congress had declined to create, and thus copyright posed more danger of monopoly 
than the rejected right. It is natural that the Copyright Act of 1976 would thus leave, 
as it did, a wide moat of public domain liberty around objects that meld form and 
function. This public-protective ring is embodied not only through narrowing the 
copyrightability of PGS useful articles. 108 The statute also limits the exclusive rights that 
 106  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defi nition of “useful article”). 
 107  In dropping the design-protection portion of the bill, Title II, the House Report gave among its 
reasons the following:
 [T] he Committee will have to examine further the assertion of the Department of Justice, 
which testifi ed in opposition to the Title, that Title II would create a new monopoly which has 
not been justifi ed by a showing that its benefi ts will outweigh the disadvantage of removing such 
designs from free public use. 
  1976 House Rep.,  supra note 82, at 49–50.  
 108  Useful articles that seek protection as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works (“PGS” works) must meet 
a demanding “separability” test:
 [t] he design of a useful article, as defi ned in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, 
or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identifi ed separately from, and are capable of existing 
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article. 
  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defi nition of “pictorial, graphic and sculptural works”). 
   In my view, the “best” account of separability is that advanced by Paul Goldstein. The key, as he 
indicates, is whether forbidding competitors to copy the copyrighted portion of the useful article 
will make the utilitarian aspects of the item less useful. For example, will removing the “aesthetic” 
component made the object do its task less well, or make the object more expensive to manufacture? 
If so, the component is not “separable.” If removing it makes no utilitarian difference, however, then 
it is “separable.” See Goldstein, 1 Copyright § 2.5.3 (physical separability exits if the sculptural 
feature “can be physically separated from the article  without impairing the article’s utility and if, once 
separated, it can stand alone as a work of art traditionally conceived,”  id . at page 2.75; conceptual 
separability arises when a feature “can stand alone as a work of art traditionally conceived,  and if the 
useful article in which it is embodied would be equally useful without it .”  Id . at page 2:78.1.) 
   In some of its cases the Second Circuit has implemented this perspective: explicitly or implicitly 
asking whether the useful article’s functions can be equally well served were the object denuded of the 
portion in which copyright is claimed. See Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 
411, 418 (2d Cir. 1985). 
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attach to any copyrights that portray useful articles – the copyright owner’s rights do not 
control what Baker called “use.” 109 
 We might, accordingly, fi nd some hints to fi ll out  Baker’s distinction between 
“use” and “explanation” in the current statute’s defi nition of “useful article.” The 
defi nition reads as follows:
 A “useful article” is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not 
merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information. 110 
 According to this defi nition, it is apparently a copyright–appropriate use “to portray 
appearance” (or, presumably to portray any pattern of form to any sense, whether 
the form be, e.g., a pattern of colors, a pattern of sounds, or a pattern of dance steps). 
Similarly, “to convey information” is also a presumptively copyright-appropriate use. 
Functions beyond “appearance” and “information” lean in the patent direction. 
Although PGS works are especially singled out for special copyrightability hurdles  111 
that do not apply to useful articles packaged in non-PGS formats, the defi nition is at 
least suggestive; it suggests that any function beyond “appearance” and “information” 
might be ripe for being classifi ed as none of copyright’s business. 
 Copyright scholars are accustomed to drawing a sharp line between “useful 
articles” that are pictorial, graphic or sculptural works (“PGS” works), on the one 
hand, and, on the other, the many other kinds of functional-but-expressive creations 
that appear in non-PGS parts of the copyright statute. Given legislative history, the 
distinction between PGS works and other works makes sense when copyrightability 
is on the table. 112 However, when “scope of right” rather than copyrightability is 
 109  See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § §113(b) and 113(c); 102(b) (2012). Subsection 113(b), discussed at further length 
 infra at the section entitled “Congressional Implementation,” provides in essence that “the copyright 
in a work portraying a useful article as such would not protect against manufacture of that article .” 
Report of the Register of Copyrights ,  General Revision of the Copyright Law (1961) at 14, 
available at  http://copyright.gov/history/1961_registers_report.pdf/ .  See also 1976  House Rep .,  supra 
note 100, at 109. 
 110  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). The statute gives force to the “useful article” concept most obviously in regard 
to Pictorial, Graphic and Sculptural (“PGS”) works:  useful articles that seek copyright under the 
PGS category must pwass a separability test, section 101, and the derivative work right attaching to 
a copyrighted PGS work that depicts a useful article is narrow and will not cover the making of the 
functional articles depicted, §113(b). 
   More controversially, “useful article” has application in regard to functional use more generally, 
pursuant to a broad but plausible reading of 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (2012). The broad reading of § 113(b) is 
discussed further  infra  at “Congressional Implementation.” 
 111  The statute gives PGS works that serve functions beyond “appearance” and “information” rough 
treatment when it comes to copyrightability. Useful PGS works must pass a ‘separability’ test, as 
discussed  supra at notes 53, 108. 
 112  “[A] lthough the shape of an industrial product may be aesthetically satisfying and valuable, the 
Committee’s intention is not to offer it copyright protection under the bill. Unless the shape of an 
automobile, airplane, ladies’ dress, food processor, television set, or any other industrial product 
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the issue, Congress has not drawn such a sharp line. All functional-but-expressive 
creations owe a confl icting allegiance to both copyright and to patent; they share 
many common policies; it may be time for “useful” PGS works and other “useful” 
works to learn something from each other. 
 The  Baker -type cases cited in copyright legislative history are in fact consistent with 
what became the 1976 defi nition of “useful article.” 113 These cases refuse to impose 
liability for making a copy or derivative work that does more than portray “appearance” 
or convey “information”– that is, the cases give an immunity for any version of the 
copyrighted work that actually functions. 
 Thus, to manufacture furniture, 114 lamps, 115 or gears 116 copied from copyrighted 
graphics in a competitor’s catalogue does not infringe the copyrights. It also does not 
infringe to build a highway/bridge interchange based on a copyrighted drawing of an 
original road design. 117 These noninfringing acts of reproduction are all uses that go 
beyond “conveying information” and “portraying” form; they are on the “use” side 
of the  Baker divide. Similarly, cases that did impose infringement verdicts (i.e., those 
on the “explanation” side of the  Baker divide) involved defendants whose purposes 
involved only “information” or “appearance.” 
 Thus, it did infringe to build a memorial 118 based on a copyrighted sculpture. 
Memorial stones only convey information (such as naming who is buried beneath, 
contains some element that, physically or conceptually, can be identifi ed as separable from the 
utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would not be copyrighted under the bill.” 1976  House 
Rep .,  supra note 100, at 55. 
 113  These were cited in regard to a provision that later became § 113. 
 114  Lamb v. Grand Rapids School Furniture Co., 39 F. 474 (W.D. Mich. 1889) (defendant alleged to have 
manufactured church furniture depicted in another entity’s copyrighted catalog and to be publishing 
as advertisements graphics showing its ‘own’ furniture that virtually duplicated the plaintiff’s original 
photos; motion seeking preliminary injunction denied). 
 115  Kashins v. Lightmakers, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (no infringement results from making 
lamps identical to those appearing in a copyrighted catalog). The case does not really assist in fl eshing 
out § 113(b), however, since the plaintiff seemed to claim no authorship in the lamp designs that 
were photographed. If the plaintiff’s originality subsisted only in choice of photographic angles and 
such, a defendant who built the objects depicted in the photo would have used nothing of what made 
the photos copyrightable. In such a case, infringement would not attach whether or not the objects 
depicted were ‘useful’. 
 116  In PIC Design Corp. v. Sterling Precision Corp., 231 F. Supp.  106 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), the defendant’s 
catalogs copied illustrations of gears from the plaintiff’s catalogs. It appears that the plaintiff had designed 
the gears, though no inquiry into their originality was made. The court noted that “the component parts 
so pictured in all the catalogs before us are in the public domain and plaintiff has no exclusive right to 
produce and illustrate them. It is the illustration that is protected, not the object itself.”  Id. at 110. 
 117  Muller v. Triborough Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp.  298, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1942)  (holding that copying a 
drawing of a highway/bridge interchange by building such a roadway does not infringe copyright in 
the drawing). 
 118  A memorial stone is not a useful article; it merely portrays appearance (e.g., angel wings) and conveys 
information (about the deceased.) To copy someone else’s art in a memorial can therefore infringe. 
Jones Bros. Co. v.  Underkoffl er, 16 F.  Supp.  729, 731 (M.D. Pa. 1936)  (memorial copied from a 
photograph was held infringing). 
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reproducing lines of poetry, conveying descriptions and dates) and portray 
appearance. 
 Similarly, making a doll 119 based on a copyrighted comic did infringe. This too 
fi ts the “useful article” defi nition; stuffed dolls are not “useful” because they employ 
only the copied work’s form and “appearance.” Today’s Copyright Offi ce does not 
consider dolls and other toys to be “useful articles.” 120 
 There is of course no prescience in the old case decisions; the judges were not 
seeking to anticipate and apply the “useful article” defi nition from the 1976 Act. To the 
contrary, any causal relation ran in the ordinary temporal direction. The pre-1976 cases 
just mentioned are based on  Baker v. Selden , and those decisions along with Baker 
are part of the source from which the 1976 defi nitional principle drew its legitimacy. 
The Justice Department’s anti-monopoly position too was hardly born the moment 
Congress heard it; the anti-monopoly strains in IP law are rooted deeply in history. 121 
 119  King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 537 (2d Cir. 1924) (fi nding defendant had infringed 
by making a three-dimensional doll from plaintiff’s two-dimensional cartoon horse “Sparky”). The 
court imposed liability by fi nding a parallel between “the production of pleasure in contemplation,” 
mentioned in  Baker v .  Selden as a legitimate copyright purpose, and the ability of Sparky to produce 
“pleasure in amusement.” Also see Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Freundlich, Inc., 73 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 
1934) (involving the Betty Boop doll). 
 120  From cases like this arose the current rule treating stuffed animals and dolls as art and not as useful 
articles. Toys and stuffed animals are typically not considered “useful articles.” Compendium II of 
Copyright Offi ce Practices at 502, available at  http://www.copyrightcompendium.com/#500. 
 121  One of the crucial milestones was the Statute of Monopolies, Westminster (1624), Primary Sources 
on Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer,  www.copyrighthistory.org . In the US, the 
importance of leaving nonpatented products open to all to copy was probably stated most clearly 
in  Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) and its companion case,  Compco Corp . 
 v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. , 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
 Precursors to the 1976 Act’s § 113 provide the following illustrative language:
 ‘*** In fact, the defendant manufactures goods from designs taken from complainants’ 
illustrations, and they say (what for the present purpose must be admitted) that their illustrations 
are in truth of their own goods, so that the similitude of the illustrations results from the fact that 
the goods are alike. The manufactures of the complainants are not patented. The defendants 
may lawfully manufacture just such goods. Can they not publish correct illustrations of them as 
adjuncts of their sale? Ought they to be restrained from doing this because the complainants, 
having done the same thing, have copyrighted illustrations which, while representing their 
own goods, represent those of the defendant also? It is clear that the books of both parties are 
published and used solely as means for advertisement. To say that the defendant has not the 
right to publish correct illustrations of its goods must practically result in creating a monopoly, 
in goods modeled on those designs, in the complainants, and thus give all the benefi ts of a 
patent upon unpatented and unpatentable articles. * * * It does not appear to me that such 
results can be accomplished in this way. It is true, there is an appearance of profi ting at another’s 
expense, and reaping what another has sown, but I can see no legal ground on which this can 
be prevented. The legislation, with its limitations, which public policy has approved, does not 
extend so broadly as to give the complainants a monopoly in the harvest in such a case.’ 
  Kashins v. Lightmakers, Inc ., 155 F. Supp.  202, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), quoting from Lamb v. Grand 
Rapids Sch. Furniture Co., 39 F. 474, 475 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1889). 
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 11.4.1.  Tentative Conclusion: Interoperability and  Baker 
 Returning to  Oracle v. Google , it is indisputable that computer programs do more 
than “portray form” and “convey information.” They make machines work, and 
when someone copies code, the copies are typically sold to people for the purpose of 
making other machines work. While neither of these facts about the use of computer 
programs is suffi cient to resolve the  Oracle case, they remind us that computer code 
may be a “useful article” and that like all useful articles, considerations of patent 
deference can and should play a strong role. 
 As mentioned,  Baker indicates that expressive use is the kind of use which 
copyright law can legitimately regulate. 122 Copying an entire copyrighted computer 
program will of necessity make use of both expressive and nonexpressive aspects, 123 
and using the copy – even using it to run a machine – could therefore infringe. 
Where any possibility exists that the defendant saved herself some expressive effort, 
and that obtaining this advantage played a nontrivial role in motivating the copying, 
it is not as clear that  Baker will shelter her behavior. 124 
 But copying that is done solely to achieve interoperability (with other programs or 
with previously acquired utilitarian skill) is fully indifferent to the copied program’s 
expressive aspects. This is true both for interoperability between the copied program 
and the copier’s program, as in  Lotus  v.  Borland , or interoperability between the 
copier’s program and third-party programs, as in  Oracle  v.  Google. What matters for 
interoperability is not the quality of expression, but exact conformity. 
 If it is correct that uses indifferent to expression cannot infringe, then a proper 
resolution of  Oracle and  Lotus is clear. In neither case would the copying infringe. 
 This result does not turn on the value or disvalue of lock-in as a social or economic 
practice. 125 A logically prior matter is whether an instance of copying is related or 
unrelated to the copied material’s expressivity. And copying to avoid lock-in certainly 
 122  See  supra  notes 56 – 62 and accompanying text. 
 123  Were a program to lack any expressive content, it could not have copyright in the fi rst instance. 
  Whether expression in a program ever “really” exists (in the ordinary-language sense of) or whether 
Congress conclusively deems it to exist (in the sense of a mandatory legal fi ction) is a question this 
chapter does not address. Many scholars have addressed the inherent conceptual instability caused 
by Congress including computer programs among the categories of potentially copyrightable subject 
matter.  See, e.g.,  Lloyd L.  Weinreb ,  Copyright for Functional Expression ,  111  Harv. L.  Rev.  1149 
( 1998 ). 
 124  The touchstone examples in  Baker involve no use of expressiveness: the medicines made by reading a 
book, the mechanical skills learned from a book . . . none copy or use the book’s mode of “statement” 
which  Baker teaches is the aspect to which copyright attaches. 
 125  Overstating the importance of lock-in economics to the  Oracle case is a mistake the Solicitor General 
made in his opposition to certiorari. See  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Oracle Am., 
Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) , available at  www.justice.gov/sites/default/fi les/osg/
briefs/2015/06/01/14-410_google_v_oracle_us_cvsg_brief.pdf . 
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seems to be unrelated to expression. When having a key made, one doesn’t care if 
the key is clunky or beautiful. Its elegance as a sculptural artifact is irrelevant. 
 All that matters is that it fi ts the lock. 
 11.4.2.  Juridical Integrity and Lack of “Fit” 
 My contention, that copying for interoperability does not infringe, cuts less broadly 
than it may seem. To better see this, it will be helpful to examine and distinguish the 
perspective that Abraham Drassinower brings to  Baker v.  Selden . 
 In Professor Drassinower’s view,  Baker demonstrates that nonexpressive, 
noncommunicative forms of copying should count as “nonuse” 126 – a behavior 
outside the copyright statutes, and thus not actionable under copyright law. 127 Only 
when a work is used expressively, as a communication, Drassinower argues, can the 
use give rise to copyright infringement. It’s not that Drassinower argues that patent’s 
public domain has “trumping” power, or that giving patent-like power to copyrights 
is socially costly; his argument is rather that copyright has no role beyond its proper 
(communicatory) sphere. 
 While I cannot agree with all of Professor Drassinower’s contentions, I fi nd an 
immensely useful starting point in Drassinower’s observation that mere mechanical 
repetition of a particular physical or audible form does not always use the work  as 
a work. 128 Sometimes, for example, it is being used as a tool (functionally) or as a 
fact (as evidence in a courtroom) or for some other purpose whose value does not 
depend on the work’s expressiveness. 
 We all know how a person can change roles, and that different roles (spouse, 
employer, enemy combatant) can trigger different rights and duties both socially 
and under law. Similarly, a given confi guration of words (or symbols, sounds, shapes, 
lines or colors) can have different roles in different contexts. 
 A new role can change the confi guration’s legal signifi cance  – either because 
copyright is juridically concerned only with one role, namely, communication (as 
 126  Abraham  Drassinower ,  What’s Wrong with Copying? ( Harvard University Press ,  2015 ), at 13 
at 13 [hereinafter “Drassinower”] (“[In  Baker , t]he defendant used the forms as a tool but not as a 
work, and was therefore not liable in copyright. . .  Baker thus turns on a crucial distinction between 
the work as a communicative act and its material form as its physical embodiment. Use of the physical 
embodiment for noncommunicative purposes does not give rise to liability.”). 
 127  Drassinower emphasizes that copyright would have reached the accounting form in  Baker if it had 
been copied as part of an explanatory book, or copied for other reasons relating to its expressive, 
authorial qualities. The defendant however copied the form for reasons relating to its  inventive 
qualities. The set of lines changed role from “work of authorship” to “tool” –resulting in a lack of fi t’ 
with copyright, and defendant was not liable. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100 (1880). 
 128  Id. at 102 (arguing that it is an error to see “any and all uses of a work’s material form” as “uses of the 
work.”) 
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Drassinower might have it), 129 or because the new role alters the work’s economic 
and social impact (as policy analysts might have it). 
 For an example of changing roles for a copyrighted work, consider a love letter 
introduced into evidence in a divorce proceeding. In the litigation context, the 
letter’s eloquence as a work of authorship is irrelevant; the literary work has become 
a fact, valued not for its beauty in language but for what it implies, factually, about 
the relationship between sender and receiver. The same copyrightable letter, now 
serving as a fact rather than as expression, under current law can be freely copied for 
evidentiary purposes in litigation. 130 It is a “fair use.” 131 
 There are  reasons for granting private rights in the fi rst instance, and rights should 
not be exercised for reasons that lie far afi eld. Functional uses, like evidentiary uses, 
do not reward quality of expression; they do not “fi t.” 
 If crafting exceptions to the public’s duty-not-to-copy were costless and perfectly 
predictable, lack of fi t standing alone would always suffi ce as ground for sheltering 
a defendant’s activity. Instead, the process consumes some governmental and 
private resources, probably increases uncertainty (in both markets and everyday 
noncommercial behaviors), and might make unlawful copying and litigation a bit 
more likely. 132 Rule of Law values such as predictability might be poorly served by 
case-by-case insistence on “fi t.” 
 Lack of “fi t” in a particular instance shows merely that enforcement will fail to 
further a particular law’s goals. Courts often want a showing that, in addition, refusing 
to enforce will achieve some  affi rmative public advantage. They want something 
that can outweigh the extra costs involved in case-by-case recrafting of the rules. 
 For an example, consider negligence law. It uses the “proximate cause” doctrine 
to immunize defendants from liability when the harm they cause is unrelated to the 
dangers that made their behavior negligent in the fi rst instance. Because there is a 
“lack of fi t” between unforeseeable harm and imposing a duty of care, a proximate 
cause limitation makes sense both on juridical grounds and on economic grounds. 133 
 129  See  generally  Drassinower ,  supra note 109. 
 130  Copying for courtroom purposes is seen as a “fair use,” recognized by cases such as Den Hollander 
v. Steinberg, 419 Fed. Appx. 44 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 131  Id. It would be more accurate to say that works of authorship become “facts” when copied for 
evidentiary purposes; unfortunately, however, clear statement about these cases is inhibited by the 
Supreme Court’s odd ontological assertion that “facts” are “found” and never “created.” Feist Pubs., 
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Svc. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (“facts do not owe their origin to an act of 
authorship.”) On this latter point, see  Wendy J.  Gordon ,  Reality as Artifact: From Feist to Fair Use ,  55 
 L. Contemp. Probs.  93 ( 1992 ). 
 132  Conceivably each case where a defendant succeeds in fi nding a limitation could encourage new types 
of copying that might hope (with less ground) to fi nd equivalent shelter. 
 133  Juridically, there is no conceptual linkage between taking reasonable care and avoiding an 
unforeseeable kind of harm. The proximate cause limitation makes sense economically as well, for 
the law is powerless to encourage people to take precautions against invisible dangers. 
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 But because “proximate cause” is implemented on a fact-sensitive, case-by-case 
basis, which is costly, we expect to fi nd more explanation for the doctrine, in addition 
to simple “lack of fi t” – and we do. Eliminating the proximate cause doctrine, which 
would mean imposing liability to the extent of all unforeseeable harms caused, could 
bring with it demoralizing 134 and crushing burdens 135 of liability. 136 These social burdens 
make a difference, particularly since, given the lack of “fi t” caused by unforeseeability, 
the burdens would not even be partially offset with gains in encouraging reasonable 
care. Taken together, these are weighty reasons to adopt a doctrine (called “proximate 
cause”) to limit liability where there is “lack of fi t” in personal injury cases. 
 I don’t deny that lack of “lack of fi t” standing alone can and should warrant limiting 
legal enforcement in some circumstances, particularly those involving free speech 
and other fundamental rights. Outside the area of fundamental rights, however, few 
judges demand that the legislature (in crafting rights) or a particular plaintiff (in 
bringing suit) demonstrate a one-on-one correlation between a particular exercise of 
right and the policies for which the right was granted. Except perhaps for juridical 
purists, law must usually operate on a more wholesale level. 137 
 Arguably copyright should be one of those rare areas where “lack of fi t” alone 
will suffi ce. 138 As a matter of fundamental right, overbroad copyright enforcement 
often threatens fi rst-amendment values. 139 As an economic matter, copyright liability 
imposes obvious social costs. Monetary incentives for new authorship are generated 
by making it more expensive to purchase copies of, or access to, existing authorship; 
the increasing costs makes authorship less available both for new authors to use 140 
and for consumers to purchase. 
 134  “Demoralization cost” is a term coined by Frank Michelman to refer to  dis incentives (effects that 
discourage productive activity) caused by the threat of large unpredictable losses.  Frank  Michelman , 
 Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation Law ,  80 
 Harv. L. Rev.  1165 , 1214 ( 1967 ). 
 135  Having to pay an immense judgment can trigger costs much higher than the numbers in the judgment 
itself. For example, tort judgments against companies can cause prices to rise and jobs to be lost; 
tort judgments against individuals may mean losing a home, which in turn leaves family members 
vulnerable to further losses. 
  The same point is true on the side of potential plaintiffs: bearing a tortious injury without receiving 
compensation can result in disastrous follow-on costs for both businesses and individuals. See  Guido 
Calabresi ,  The Costs of Accidents ,  27 – 28 ( Yale University Press ,  1970 ) (“secondary costs”). 
Identifying which kinds of cost are likely to be more serious in varying circumstances is the task of 
empirical research. 
 136  I am indebted to Bob Bone here. 
 137  I am indebted to discussions with Jane Ginsburg for her insistence on this point. 
 138  Fundamental liberties are usually linked to avoiding important harms; when this is true, the lack of fi t 
 means an “extra” element of social harm is present. 
 139  Admittedly, we commentators perceive these threats to free speech far more easily than do the courts. 
 140  A classic statement of these issues is  William  Landes &  Richard  Posner ,  An Economic Analysis of 
Copyright Law ,  18  J. Leg. Stud.  325 ( 1989 ). 
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 These ever-present risks counsel that copyright’s scope should generally remain 
within the arena where these social costs are most likely to be outweighed by copyright’s 
positive incentive effects – which is, defi nitionally, the arena where the elements of the 
cause of action are a “good fi t” with statutory purpose. Only in the area of “fi t” – authorial 
works being used for authorial purposes – is the ability of copyright enforcement to 
produce more benefi ts than costs likely to be more than coincidental. And indeed, 
in copyright law, the fair use doctrine and a multitude of specifi c exemptions provide 
some shelter from simple “lack of fi t.” But we have no consensus on how far the shelter 
should extend, and at the moment it is far from complete. 141 
 As an example of a “lack of fi t” that might not give rise to a copyist victory, 
consider a hypothetical decorator who has noticed that sheet music can make 
visually pleasing patterns, and who begins manufacturing wallpaper that duplicates 
the appearance of copyrighted sheet music. In papering its customers’ walls with a 
particular composer’s clefs, eighth-notes, sharps and so on, the wallpaper maker is 
not using the musical work  as a musical work. Any connection between the notes’ 
visual appeal and the quality of the work’s intended aural expression is purely 
coincidental. Allowing the composer to collect monies from the wallpaper maker 
does nothing to reward composing skill or encourage its further development. 
 There is no “fi t.” 
 It is possible such copying might be sheltered from liability. 142 Yet given the 
commercial nature of the use, and the obscurity of any claim the wallpaper might 
have to be serving the public interest, as a descriptive matter the defendant’s 
likelihood of success is rather low. 
 By way of contrast, recall the example of copyrighted works being reproduced 
for evidentiary use in court. Courts understand the importance of providing factual 
evidence for litigation, and understand also how often the author of an incriminating 
document might wish to assert copyright to prevent its being copied. Establishing 
a rule that permits copying for evidentiary purposes serves a public interest easily 
understood, and therefore such copying is routinely accommodated by copyright’s 
fair use doctrine. Judges are likely to be sensitive to the different levels of social 
interest at stake and, even in copyright, “lack of fi t” alone will not always generate 
shelter for an act of unconsented copying. 
 141  As a matter of current doctrine, a court might impose copyright liability despite “lack of fi t” unless the 
defendant can demonstrate an additional public interest dimension that would be served by giving her 
the contested liberty of action. Stacey Dogan makes this point about trademark law.  Stacey  Dogan , 
 Principled Standards vs. Boundless Discretion ,  37  Colum. J. L. Arts  503, 506 ( 2014 ). 
 142  It might, for example, be considered “transformative” under the fair use doctrine. See, e.g., Bill 
Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding it was fair use for 
defendant to reproduce miniaturized copies of copyrighted ‘Grateful Dead’ concert posters to mark a 
graphical timeline of the band’s history). 
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 Moreover, the Supreme Court has upheld two statutory expansions of copyright 
with only the roughest guess as to “fi t.” Both term extension and statutory 
restoration of public domain copyrights have doubtful ability to further copyright 
goals, and both statutes have implications for free speech; but when these 
statutes were challenged the Court declined to employ strict scrutiny. 143 These 
developments counsel caution, even though the judiciary’s role in deploying 
doctrines like the “use/explanation” distinction or “fair use” is different from the 
role the Supreme Court plays in reviewing the constitutionality of Congressional 
statutes. 
 For such reasons, this chapter does not claim (as a descriptive matter) that a 
lack of “fi t” between a copyright defendant’s actions and copyright law’s overall 
policy will always suffi ce to defeat liability. Also, given the real costs of making 
fi ne distinctions among cases, this chapter does not claim (as a normative matter) 
that all non-fi tting cases of copying should escape liability. What the chapter does 
claim is that line-drawing is worth the cost when copyright threatens to control the 
kinds of functional uses that  Baker saw as properly relegated to patent. Imposing 
liability on purely functional uses not only fails to advance the goal of incentivizing 
expressive activity, but such liability has the potential for undermining the patent 
system, with effects such as decreasing the disclosure of inventions, and shrinking 
free competition among unpatented utilitarian products. The result, in  Baker’s 
language, could be a “fraud upon the public.” 144 
 These are matters whose importance is diffi cult to understate. Therefore, when 
it comes to a particular kind of disjunction – between  expressive use and  functional 
use , or (putting it somewhat differently) between  authorship and  invention  – the 
Supreme Court in  Baker held that the cost of disregarding the “lack of fi t” is too 
high. 
 That, I would argue, is the essential point of  Baker v.  Selden. 
 143  See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) upholding the revival of certain copyrights already in the 
public domain; Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (upholding the constitutionality of the Sonny 
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act). 
  In  Eldred the Court defi ned its path:  declining to apply a heightened degree of scrutiny. The 
opinion states that “copyright law contains built-in First Amendment accommodations” such as “fair 
use” and the idea/expression dichotomy,  id. at 219, that make lesser scrutiny appropriate. Further, to 
measure whether “Congress’ exercise of its Copyright Clause authority” was “rational,”  id. at 206, the 
Court employed an extremely broad notion of what purposes federal copyright could legitimately 
serve. See generally  Wendy J.  Gordon ,  The Core of Copyright: Authors, Not Publishers ,  52  Houston 
L. Rev .  613 ( 2014 ) (criticizing  Eldred’ s analysis of copyright’s purpose). 
 144  Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1880). 
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 11.4.3.  Should Mixed Uses Qualify for  Baker’s Shelter 
 This chapter interprets  Baker as resting not only on juridical coherence in 
Drassinower’s sense, but also on consideration of social and economic cost. To 
obtain  Baker’s shelter, then, two elements are needed:  the user’s indifference to 
expression (that is, “nonuse” in Drassinower’s sense) and interference in patent law’s 
domain. 
 Must the use be purely functional, with no admixture of expressive value? From 
an abstract juridical perspective, as long as some expressive value inheres in the use, 
copyright should be able to fi nd a mixed use (both expressive and functional) to be 
an infringement. Yet, concerns from outside of copyright (such as pressure from 
patent’s public domain) might counsel against copyright owners having rights over 
a mixed area. In terms of  Baker’s policies, an expressive value should be capable 
of being outweighed or even trumped by a functional role. Under  Baker , must 
copyright remain unenforced whenever the use has a functional aspect? These 
questions remain open, for in terms of our facts – those of  Oracle and  Lotus  – the 
nature of the use is fairly “pure” in its functionality. 
 How do we know when a work of authorship is being used solely as a functional 
tool? 145 As suggested above, the answer must surely lie in determining whether the 
defendant is indifferent to the stylistic or expressive aspect – if the defendant would 
copy whatever the language or style might be, not caring in the least for the content 
but only for its physical effects, then the copying is of the “tool” variety and copyright 
law does not (or at least should not) reach it. 146 
 11.4.4.  Directness 
 Does the Baker rule apply only to shelter the “users” who employ the copy 
functionally, or does it also shelter those from whom the “users” purchased the 
copies? Lawyers usually think of “direct” versus “contributory” roles in terms of 
secondary liability. (For example, we debate whether computer programs that allow 
consumers to violate copyright law should be held responsible for the consumers’ 
unlawful behavior. 147 ) In discussing the how far the  Baker doctrine reaches, however, 
 145  Within “sole” or “pure” functional use, I include functional uses that are insubstantially or trivially 
concerned with expression. 
 146  It may be that mixed uses of copyright works should sometimes be sheltered from liability. I need not 
reach that question, for copying sequences of command names ( Lotus ) or method headers ( Oracle ) 
for purposes of defeating switching costs is not a mixed case. 
 147  See, e.g.,  Wendy J.  Gordon ,  Moral Philosophy, Information Technology, and Copyright: The Grokster 
Case ,  in  Information Technology And Moral Philosophy  270  ( Jeroen  van den Hoven &  John 
 Weckert , eds.) ( Cambridge University Press ,  2008 ). 
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we address the converse: whether an actor’s contribution to another person’s lawful 
act can be sheltered by the lawfulness of the assisted behavior. 
 The issue has signifi cance in many areas of copyright law, particularly fair use, 
but within the confi nes of  Baker it can be resolved straightforwardly. The defendant 
in  Baker v.  Selden was manufacturing account books for  sale to others. Nothing 
in the opinion suggests it would have been necessary for the defendant to have 
used the account books himself. Similarly, when a manufacturer uses a competitor’s 
catalogue or drawings without permission as his source for his new product line, the 
statute shelters not only those who  use the product he makes, but the manufacturers, 
retailers and advertisers as well. 148 Therefore precedent and statutory analogy suggest 
that “directness of use” is not a prerequisite to shelter under  Baker . 
 11.5.  Resistance to the Use/Explanation Distinction 
 Some resistance to making distinctions among types of use is evident. One hears 
comments such as, “If an arrangement of lines or symbols is someone’s property, 
the owners should be able control any use they want. That’s what property is for.” 
At one point the Nimmer copyright treatise similarly opines that “the question of 
liability should turn simply on whether the defendant has copied copyrightable 
elements contained in the plaintiff’s work, without regard to the manner in which 
the defendant uses or intends to use the copied material.” 149 This cannot be taken 
literally. An exemption for patent-type “use” is hardly the only copyright limitation 
tied to “use” issues. 
 11.5.1.  “Rights Over Use” as a Conceptual and Economic Fulcrum 
 All of copyright operates on two dimensions – to prevail in an infringement suit, a 
plaintiff must prove (1) ownership of appropriate (copyrightable)  subject matter and 
(2) that his or her  exclusive rights include control over the use that the defendant has 
made of the copyrighted subject matter. 
 The overall structure of the Copyright Act thus ties the defi nition of a copyright 
owner’s rights to defi ned uses, so that prima facie liability always varies with the 
 148  17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (anyone engaged in “making, distribution, or display”); also see § 113(c) (“In the case 
of a work lawfully reproduced in useful articles that have been offered for sale or other distribution 
to the public, copyright does not include any right to prevent the making, distribution, or display of 
pictures or photographs of such articles in connection with advertisements or commentaries related 
to the distribution or display of such articles, or in connection with news reports.”). 
 149  1–2  Nimmer on Copyright at § 2.18 [D] [1]. The Treatise continues: “If . . . copying of copyrightable 
expression occurs, then infringement should be found, even if the defendant employs the material for 
use rather than for explanation”  Id. 
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nature of the defendant’s use even in the statute’s operative core, § 106. 150 A host 
of additional uses are categorized as not infringing. 151 So, for example, since only 
“public” performances can infringe, 152 an allegation of private performance would 
be dismissed as not satisfying the plaintiff’s obligation to present a prima facie case. 
The same should be true when a plaintiff seeks copyright redress for rights that 
the Supreme Court or Congress has removed from the copyright owner as better 
relegated to patent’s domain. 
 As already mentioned, copyright’s statutory structure places emphasis on 
distinguishing among uses. Differences among uses are also central to how copyright 
functions as an economic engine. 
 Congress provides incentives to authors largely by helping copyright owners 
subject the users of their works to differential pricing (“price discrimination”) 
according to intensity of use. 153 Copyright law embodies a set of Congressional 
decisions about  which uses of a copy should be subjected to this legal power to meter 
(and price) types and frequency of usage. 
 150  See  Wendy J.  Gordon ,  Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination:  Implications for Contract ,  73 
 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.  1367 ( 1998 ). 
  It is equally hard to understand the purported irrelevance of “use” from a statutory perspective. The 
Copyright Act throughout varies rights and duties according to the nature of the use, starting with 
the basic section of copyright owner rights in Section 106, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). The statute also 
empowers judges to make general variations by “use” in the fair use doctrine, 17 U.S.C. § 107, and 
variations according to use are fl eshed out in the dozens of specifi c use-limitations embedded in the 
statute.  Id. at 108–22. 
 151  The shape of a copyright owner’s exclusive rights can be determined only by examining a wide range 
of sections, namely 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–122, but the primary section is §106. It is subdivided by type of 
use, from reproduction to performance:
  § 106. Subject to Sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive 
rights to do and to authorize any of the following: 
 (1)  to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
 (2)  to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
 (3)  to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer 
of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
 (4)  in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion 
pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; 
 (5)  in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and 
 (6)  in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital 
audio transmission. 
 152  17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012) (right of public performance for literary works, musical works and additional 
works other than sound recordings); id., § 106(6) (right of public performance for sound recordings). 
 153  See   Gordon ,  supra  note 150. 
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 To illustrate, consider again the right of “public performance.” 154 Because the 
statute gives the copyright owner prima facie rights to control public performance, 
the copyright owner can distinguish in pricing between the person who wants to 
read a literary work silently to herself, and a person who wants to read the work 
aloud at an auditorium or on radio. The silent reader pays whatever price for the 
copy was charged by her bookstore or online supplier; her use is contained in the 
base price. By contrast, the public performer has to negotiate and pay something 
beyond the price of the copy in order to avoid the risk of an infringement suit. She 
needs to purchase a permission or set of permissions to cover her behavior, which 
usually means she has to disclose to the copyright owner economically meaningful 
data about her behavior in order to obtain a meaningful license. 155 
 Conversely, because the statute gives the copyright owner no rights to control 
 private performance, the copyright owner will fi nd it harder to distinguish in pricing 
between, say, a person who wants to read to herself the published script of a play, and 
an ambitious society host who wants to have his friends perform the play during a series 
of dinner parties. These all are private uses under the statute, 156 and do not fall within 
the domain of an exclusive right. The private reader, the living-room performers, and 
the host may have very differing values for the text, but each pays the same (base) price 
for a copy, without risk of liability arising from how they are using it. Congress has 
decided not to help copyright owners distinguish among these home uses. 
 Defi ning the types and limits of “exclusive right” is an important part of how 
Congress calibrates the balance between public domain and public duty. Uses that 
are within the copyright domain impose duties on the general citizenry to either 
obtain permissions or refrain from use. Uses that are not within copyright owners’ 
control lie in copyright’s public domain. 157 
 So “exclusive rights” over types of use are always crucial. It would be odd indeed 
if one of copyright’s most important policies  – to avoid interference with patent 
law – found expression only in the dimension of “subject matter” and none in the 
dimension of “exclusive right.” 158 
 154  17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012) (for literary works, musical works, and additional works other than sound 
recordings) and  id., § 106(6) (for sound recordings). 
 155  This brief discussion of permissions is not fully generalizable. A purchaser (rather than a seeker of 
specifi c permissions) may be better able to conceal details. But even a purchaser of copyrights needs 
to identify herself as such, giving the potential seller some notice of her plans. 
 156  Under the statute, a place is not public if it is open only to “a normal circle of a family and its social 
acquaintances.”  See 17 U.S.C. §101 (2012) (defi nition of “publicly”). 
 157  That a behavior like “building a machine” is in copyright’s public domain means that the behavior 
cannot be restrained or penalized by copyright. If a utility patent exists that covers the machine, 
however, the behavior is not in  patent’s public domain, and can be restrained by patent law. 
 158  See the discussion of Hohfeld’s terminology,  supra note 98. 
 In sum, a copyright owner’s claim rights over use correlate with the public’s duty to refrain from 
such use. 
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 11.5.2.  Further Buttressing  Baker’s Use/Explanation Distinction from Attack 
 The  Oracle court ignored  Baker’s careful distinction between different kinds of 
rights of control, and instead treated  Baker as an on-off switch that determines 
copyrightability. The fullest articulation of the reasons for such an approach appears 
in the Nimmer Treatise, which argues that, “If copying of copyrightable expression 
occurs, then infringement should be found, even if the defendant employs the 
material for use rather than for explanation.” 159 (Although David Nimmer, the 
current author of the Treatise, indicates he is rethinking its position, 160 the Treatise’s 
provides a useful point of departure from which to crystallize discussion.) 
 There are several reasons why it is erroneous to reject the “use/explanation” 
distinction. Three reasons are matters of positive law. First, the Nimmer position 
relies on dicta from a 1954 case whose reasoning is itself unreliable on this score. 
Second, rejecting the “use/explanation” distinction ignores both the language of 
 Baker itself and post-1954 instantiations of  Baker in the courts. Third, a rejection of 
the “use/explanation” distinction is puzzling because Congress explicitly adopted 
an immunity for practical “use” in the current Copyright Act. 161 Finally, as a policy 
matter, ignoring a defendant’s type of use would be inconsistent with both the 
juridical integrity and economic logic of the copyright system. 
 1954 Dicta 
 In rejecting the “use/explanation” distinction of  Baker , the Nimmer treatise relies 
heavily on the 1954 Supreme Court opinion,  Mazer v. Stein . 162 In  Mazer , a statuette 
of a Balinese dancer was employed as the base for an electric lamp, and copied for 
a similar use by another lamp maker. 163 The 1954 Court approved  Baker , but gave 
 Baker a reading that cautiously depended on the case’s particular facts:
 Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection 
is given only to the expression of the idea – not the idea itself. Thus, in  Baker  v. 
 Selden , 101 U.S. 99, the Court held that a copyrighted book on a peculiar system 
 159  The Treatise argues, Nimmer on Copyright sec. 2.18; also see sec. 2.18 at n 44. Nimmer’s claim has 
had some infl uence. See, e.g., Close to My Heart, Inc. v. Enthusiast Media LLC, 508 F. Supp. 2d 963 
at n.3 (2007). 
 160  See  infra  note 180 . At one point the Treatise follows an interpretation of  Baker far more congenial to 
the instant chapter’s viewpoint. See  1 – 2 Nimmer on Copyright  § 2.08[1] [a] (2015). 
 161  17 U.S.C. § 113(b), set forth infra at  note 175, and interpreted as set forth at text accompanying note 
186 . This section incorporates by reference a series of cases that, largely relying on  Baker , refuse to 
allow the copyright in a work that depicts a useful article – such as the copyright in a sketch depicting 
an automobile or the copyright in a blueprint depicting a motor – to be asserted against persons who 
actually make or build the useful article itself. 
 162  See, e.g.,  Nimmer on Copyright sec. 2.18 
 163  Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
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of bookkeeping was not infringed by a similar book using a similar plan which 
achieved similar results where the alleged infringer made a different arrangement 
of the columns and used different headings.  164 
 Nimmer points to this observation in arguing that the Supreme Court in  Mazer 
stripped from  Baker ’s heritage its concerns with functional use. 165 
 I think such reasoning – trying to turn  Baker ’s own language into a version of the 
idea/expression dichotomy  – misses the mark. As Professor Pamela Samuelson has 
emphasized, the Court’s concern in  Baker was not with the general principle, already 
recognized well prior to 1880, that copyright needed to distinguish abstract general ideas 
from particularized expression, but with preventing copyright from interfering with the 
balance between competition and incentive set by Congress in the law of utility patent. 166 
 It was natural for the Court in  Mazer to have treaded gingerly in discussing 
 Baker. In  Mazer , the Supreme Court held that the copyright in the statuette 
gave the plaintiff a valid copyright infringement suit against the competing lamp 
maker. 167 Yet lamp-making is a utilitarian kind of use, and  Baker cautioned against 
extending copyright over utilitarian uses. 168 So perhaps it was fear of being accused 
of inconsistency with  Baker that led the Supreme Court in  Mazer to stick to the 
narrowest reading of the early case. 169 
 In hindsight, however, we see that the  Mazer Court had no reason to fear 
inconsistency with  Baker . The freedom to “use” that was recognized in  Baker only 
gave freedom to use  for functional purposes , that is, freedom to copy for purposes 
other than explanation and the satisfaction of aesthetic “taste.” 170 By contrast with 
 Selden’s accounting forms, the Balinese dancer’s form served only “taste.” The 
statuette’s expressive form and graceful lines had no impact on function: it did not 
make the lamp’s shine any brighter or the lamp’s structure any more stable. 
 To further see that the statuette served no “functional” purpose, notice what 
happens if the statuette’s expressive features are eliminated: Filing away the dancer’s 
sculpted dress and body would leave a smooth ceramic cylinder. The cylinder 
could hold up the lightbulb and shade  – the lamp would function as well as it 
 164   Id. at 217. 
 165  Nimmer on Copyright sec. 2.18 
 166  See generally , Samuelson,  Systems and Processes, supra note 66;  Pamela  Samuelson ,  CONTU 
Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form , 
 1984  Duke L. J.  663 ; and Pamela Samuelson,  Baker v. Selden: Sharpening the Distinction Between 
Authorship and Invention in  Intellectual Property Stories (Jane C. Ginsburg and Rochelle 
Cooper Dreyfuss, eds. 2006). 
 167  Mazer , 347 U.S. at 214. 
 168  Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1880). 
 169  Mazer , 347 U.S. at 217. 
 170  As mentioned above,  Baker cautioned that its “observations are not intended to apply to ornamental 
designs or pictorial illustrations addressed to the taste.”  Baker , 101 U.S. at 103–4. 
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did before. 171 So enforcing copyright in the statuette posed no direct challenge to 
patent law: competition based on the  functions of a lamp could proceed unimpeded 
whether or not the Balinese dancer shape had a copyright. 172 That being the case, 
the defendant in  Mazer was not threatened by  Baker , even if the Court in 1954 was 
not yet in a position to articulate why. 173 
 The results of the two opinions are suffi ciently consistent with each other that 
their statutory embodiments are near neighbors. Section 113(a) of the Copyright 
Act embodies  Mazer 174 and § 113(b) 175 (which will be discussed further below) 
embodies  Baker. 
 Baker and Caselaw Progeny 
 The Nimmer treatise relied on 1954 dicta from  Mazer which depicted defendant’s 
victory in  Baker as resting on a lack of substantial similarity between defendant’s 
forms and plaintiff’s form. The dicta did not accurately portray  Baker v. Selden. The 
Supreme Court’s 1880 opinion in  Baker showed no concern with determining how 
similar defendant’s forms were to those of plaintiff. 
 171  See Samuelson,  Systems and Processes ,  supra note 66, at 1960 (“Because Stein’s [plaintiff’s] lamps did 
not function any better or worse for having Stein’s statuette as a base instead of a block of wood, it is 
consistent with  Baker to hold that the statuettes were, indeed, copyrightable subject matter because 
the artistic designs they embodied were physically as well as conceptually separable from the lamps.”). 
 172  That is not to claim that  Mazer ’s impact was fully costless. The  Mazer ruling did make it more 
expensive for competitors to make lamps; they could not use plaintiff’s lamp base as a form for “direct 
molding” and similar processes, or if they did, they would have to then strip off the dancer’s features. 
However, the cost difference related only to decoration, not to function. 
 173  See Samuelson,  Systems and Processes ,  supra note 66, at 1960 (“Mazer’s observation about differences 
between the  Selden and  Baker forms was a simple misreading of Baker, not a radical reinterpretation 
of the case, its holding, and the holdings of Baker’s progeny.”). 
 174  Section 113(a) provides:
 Subject to the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section, the exclusive right to reproduce 
a copyrighted pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work in copies under section 106 includes the 
right to reproduce the work in or on any kind of article, whether useful or otherwise. 
 17 U.S.C. § 113(a) (2012). Thus, under 113(a), a statuette of a dancer did not lose copyright by being 
fastened to a bulb. 
 175  Subsection 113(b) was a response to questions such as, “[W] ould copyright in a drawing or model of 
an automobile give the artist the exclusive right to make automobiles of the same design?” Congress 
essentially answered “no.” See 1976  House Rep .,  supra note 100, at 109. The statute provides:
 §113 (b) This title does not afford, to the owner of copyright in a work that portrays a useful 
article as such, any greater or lesser rights with respect to the making, distribution, or display of 
the useful article so portrayed than those afforded to such works under the law, whether title 17 
or the common law or statutes of a State, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held applicable and 
construed by a court in an action brought under this title. 
 17 U.S.C. § 113(b). This provision is discussed further  infra at ———. 
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 Moreover, judicial decisions since 1954 continued to posit that the functional copying 
of a copyrighted design is noninfringing. As one such court said, “It is the illustration 
that is protected, not the object itself.” 176 The post- Mazer precedent includes cases on 
which Congress relied in drafting the 1976 Copyright Act. 177 
 Congressional Implementation 
 An absolutist approach to “copyright as property” might suggest that an owner’s rights 
will be unvarying, and that the public has no shelter for “copying for use.” Yet not 
only does  Baker provide such a shelter, but Congress has also implemented  Baker by 
explicitly enacting a statutory shelter as well. Subsection 113(b) provides that copyright 
in a drawing or model that “portrays a useful article as such” (such as a copyrighted 
sketch of a garment, or a copyrighted blueprint for a machine) does not grant its owner 
the full scope of ordinary rights to control derivative works. 178 
 Subsection 113(b) directs that the copyright owner has no rights over the “making, 
distribution or display” of the useful article depicted. 179 This is by way of contrast 
 176  PIC Design Corp. v. Sterling Precision Corp., 231 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). It is not clear that the 
plaintiff could have claimed originality in the design, however. A better case is Muller v. Triborough 
Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (which predated Mazer). In  Muller v. Triborough , 
the plaintiff claimed “that his copyrighted drawing [of a design to unsnarl traffi c at a bridge approach] 
was novel and unique and originated with him.” Citing  Baker , the court characterized the design as 
a “system” and ruled for the defendant despite arguable similarities between the drawings and the 
actual roads the defendant had built. Note that no challenge was made to the copyrightability of the 
drawing. 
 177  The primary legislative report for the current Act mentioned with approval a list of twelve cases that 
had appeared in the Supplemental Report of the Register of Copyright (1965) at 48. See 1976  House 
Rep .,  supra note 100, at 109. Many of the cited cases predate  Mazer in 1954, but some came later. 
See DeSilva Construction Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Fla. 1962);  PIC Design Corp. , 
231 F. Supp.  at 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Thus, the  DeSilva court cited the major copyright treatise of 
its day, Ball on  The Law of Copyright and Literary Property , which in turn explicitly relied 
on  Baker .  De Silva , 213 F. Supp. at 195–6. (Note, however, that the  Baker rationale was only one 
ground of several for dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint in  DeSilva .) These cases are discussed at 
 supra  notes 120 – 123 . 
 178  17 U.S.C. § 113(b) provides:
 This title does not afford, to the owner of copyright in a work that portrays a useful article 
as such, any greater or lesser rights with respect to the making, distribution, or display of the 
useful article so portrayed than those afforded to such works under the law, whether title 17 or 
the common law or statutes of a State, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held applicable and 
construed by a court in an action brought under this title. 
 Section 113(b) constitutionality is open to question on the ground of vagueness. Its vagueness may not 
be fatal: at least one federal statute was held constitutional even though it incorporated state law not 
yet enacted or decided. United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958). But § 113(b) makes reference 
to state and federal law in a manner so general it leaves open to question even the sources to be 
incorporated by reference. See, e.g.,  Goldstein On Copyright § 7.4.4 (2014), especially 7:116–1120 
(presenting some of the puzzles generated by the subsection’s imprecision). 
 179  17 U.S.C. § 113(b). 
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to the usual rule, under which the maker of two-dimensional portrayals (say, a 
drawing of a sculpture, or a sketch of a cartoon character) has derivative-work rights 
to control the portrayal being adapted into three-dimensional form. Thus, the owner 
of copyright in a drawing of a car can control the making of toys, murals, or movies 
based on the drawing, but cannot control the construction of a working automobile 
based on it. 
 Subsection 113(b) limits the rights that attach to copyrighted portrayals of useful 
articles, but does not impact the copyrightability of the portrayals themselves. 
(Drawings, models, blueprints, or other portrayals of a useful article are not themselves 
“useful articles” because they do no more than convey information or portray 
appearance. 180 Since the drawings, etc., are not useful articles, in order to obtain 
copyright the portrayals need not pass the “separability test” to which useful articles 
are subject. 181 ) Rather, § 113(b) leaves intact the copyrightability of any expression that 
depicts a useful article, and instead limits the rights that attach to owning the portrayal. 
 Patent law imposes many subtle limits on copyright, but the limit in § 113(b) is 
hit-over-the-head necessary: Should rights against copying attach to an innovation 
merely by drawing it, describing it, or modeling it in clay, few inventors would go 
through the expensive and uncertain route of trying to persuade federal patent 
examiners that their mechanical invention is “novel” and nonobvious’ – especially 
since the payoff from succeeding in the more diffi cult and more costly route of 
seeking a utility patent would be to receive a right only marginally stronger than 
copyright’s 182 and which lasts for a term of protection far shorter than copyright 
provides. 183 A whole area of patent law – at least, patents in mechanical confi gurations, 
 184 and perhaps other types of inventions as well –would cease to exist, and with it 
 180  Under the statute, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012), “A “useful article” is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian 
function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.” 
Therefore, a work is not “useful” (in the sense of being dangerous to patent) unless it does something 
more than “convey information” or “portray appearance.” 2  Nimmer on Copyright § 2.18 (2015). 
A blueprint for a mechanical device is not a “useful article,” even though the device  as built will be a 
“useful article.”  Id. 
 181  The copyrightability of useful articles that are PGS works depends on whether the “separability” 
test can be passed. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defi nition of PGS works). Useful articles of other kinds 
might need to pass different tests, such as proof that giving copyright will not restrain competition 
in providing the function because, e.g., ample alternatives to the plaintiff’s expression exist that have 
equal and equivalent functional advantages. 
 182  As mentioned, patent plaintiffs do not have to prove copying, but with technological change spreading 
works across the globe, copyright plaintiffs fi nd it progressively easier to lead juries to fi nd “copying” 
has occurred. 
 183  Depending on circumstances, copyrights remain in private ownership at least for seventy years, and 
often for well over a century. Utility patents expire after twenty years. 
 184  Subsection 113(b) is usually understood as addressing pictorial works or models that depict functional 
three-dimensional objects. As I  argue below, the subsection is not explicitly so limited, and can 
also be understood as applying to non-PGS works that implicate patent issues, such as computer 
programs. 
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would also disappear the “rights to copy and to use” that patent gives to nonpatented 
inventions. 185 Subsection 113(b) prevents that from happening. 
 Here is a Copyright Offi ce Report illustrating the subsection’s impact on day-to-
day objects:
 [T] he copyright in a work portraying a useful article as such would not protect 
against manufacture of that article. . . 
 [C] opyright protection would not extend to the following cases: 
•  A copyrighted drawing of a chair, used to manufacture chairs of that design; 
•  A copyrighted scale model of an automobile, used to manufacture automobiles 
of that design; 
•  A copyrighted technical drawing showing the construction of a machine, used 
to manufacture the machine; 
•  A copyrighted picture of a dress, used to manufacture the dress. 186 
 Thus, copyright can subsist in a drawing of a dress, in a blueprint of a car, or in 
a scale model of a tractor or teapot. Someone who makes an unauthorized copy 
of such a drawing for illustrative use in a coffee-table book would infringe the 
copyright, as would someone who reproduced the scale models in a toy 187 or in a 
new scale model. Those are not uses of functional application that threaten patent. 
By contrast, under  Baker and under § 113(b), the public may lawfully employ the 
copyrighted drawing or model to construct working, full-size versions of the car, 
dress, tractor or teapot. This is certainly a special exception pertaining to “copying 
for use.” 
 11.6.  Subsection 113(b) Applied Directly to Computer Programs 
 Subsection 113(b) does more than support the “use/explanation distinction” in 
 Baker. The section can be applied on its own terms to computer copyright litigation. 
 185  Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 164–5 (1989):
 [T] he federal standards for patentability, at a minimum, express the congressional determination 
that patent-like protection is unwarranted as to certain classes of intellectual property. . . . For 
almost 100 years it has been well established that in the case of an expired patent, the federal 
patent laws  do create a federal right to “copy and to use.”  Sears and  Compco extended that rule 
to potentially patentable ideas which are fully exposed to the public. (Emphasis in original.) 
 186  Report of the Register of Copyrights ,  supra note 109. This 1961 Report was approved in the 
1965  Supplementary  Report at pages ix & 47–9, and that Report in turn was relied on in the 
drafting of Subsection 113(b) in the 1976 Copyright Act. See 1976  House Rep .,  supra note 100, at 109. 
 187  That making toys lies on the “copyright” side of the line was fi rst determined in King Features 
Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924). 
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 Programmers write human-readable code (“source code”) that is then “compiled” 
into the binary patterns that computers can understand. The resulting binary pattern, 
called “object code,” does more than portray information and appearance: object 
code runs the machine. Object code is thus a “useful article.” 188 It might be argued 
that human-readable source code is a “portrayal” of that useful article. If so, § 113(b) 
might mandate that any functional copy made from source code is immune from 
charges of copyright infringement. 
 The following discussion addresses three issues:  whether the subsection’s 
language permits or requires it to be applied to computer programs; whether the 
section’s origin in  Baker allows the subsection to be applied to computer programs 
and other “literary works”; and whether § 113(b) would immunize not only purely 
nonexpressive uses, but also functional uses that contain a substantial admixture of 
expressive use. 
 11.6.1.  Language 
 Subsection 113(b) appears in a section entitled, “Scope of exclusive rights in pictorial, 
graphic and sculptural works.” Computer programs are not categorized not as PGS 
works but rather as “literary works.” 189 The section title seems therefore to indicate 
that subsection (b) does not apply to computer programs. 
 However, titles do not trump plain meaning. “[A] heading. . . . cannot limit the 
plain meaning of the text.” 190 
 The language of § 113(b) itself does not mention PGS works. It could have done 
so; the language of the preceding subsection, § 113(a), quite explicitly limits itself 
to the PGS category. 191 The language of § 113(b) is by contrast not limited to any 
particular category of works. 
 The statute’s defi nition of “useful article,” too, is not limited to PGS works or any 
other particular category of works. 192 Any work that does more than “portray” form 
 188  17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘useful article’ is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely 
to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”) 
 189  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) (subject matter), 101 (defi nitions) (2012). 
 190  Yule Kim,  Statutory Interpretation:  General Principles and Recent Trends 31–2  CRS Report for 
Congress (2008), available at  http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97–589.pdf . 
 191  17 U.S.C. §§ 113(a) provides:
 Subject to the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section, the exclusive right to reproduce 
a copyrighted pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work in copies under Section 106 includes the 
right to reproduce the work in or on any kind of article, whether useful or otherwise. 
 In my view, subsection (b) articulates a generally applicable rule to remind courts not to let copyright 
erode patent via § 113(a). 
 192  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). (“A ‘useful article’ is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not 
merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”) 
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or “convey information” (that is, any work that goes beyond serving the expressive 
functions appropriate for copyright regulation) is a “useful article” 193  – which makes 
sense, for any such work potentially has implications for patent. 
 Subsection 113(b) incorporates pre-1978 caselaw by reference, and the legislative 
history mentions particular cases and gives a number of examples. On the one hand, 
that the caselaw cited in the legislative history seems to involve only PGS works 194 
might suggest the subsection should be confi ned to the PGS context and not extend 
to computer programs. On the other hand, none of the cited pre-1978 opinions 
expressly limits its principles only to the PGS category. 
 The focus on PGS fact patterns is explicable given technological context. The 
bulk of the cited examples date from a 1961 Report, 195 and the list of cited cases 
come from a 1965 Copyright Offi ce Report. 196 At that stage in law and technology, 
copyright in product shapes posed the most obvious danger to patent. 197 The same 
policies that in the 1960s triggered concerns with product shape, today also trigger 
concerns with computer programs. 
 An additional wrinkle is presented by Congress’s actions in 1980. To see its 
signifi cance, consider some background: 
 Recall that § 113(b) incorporates caselaw ending in 1977 – that is, cases decided 
 prior to the effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act. 198 In 1977, computer programs 
 193  I am on somewhat less secure ground here. The defi nition of “useful article” indicates that proper 
copyright functions are to convey information or “ to portray the appearance of the article .”  Id. The 
word “article” is quite general, which helps my interpretation, but the word also has connotations of 
physicality that work against my interpretation. Similar ambiguity affl icts the word “appearance.” The 
term “appearance” can mean any kind of “seeming,” thus standing in for all types of form. This helps 
my interpretation. But the word “appearance” also has visual connotations. 
 194  Most of the examples and cases cited by Congress or the Copyright Offi ce addressed whether 
manufacturers infringed when they based their three-dimensional functional products on 
two-dimensional drawings whose copyrights were owned by others. The cases are summarized in 
 supra notes 113–121. 
 195  Report of the Register of Copyrights ,  supra note 109. This 1961 Report was approved in the 
1965  Supplementary  Report at pages ix & 47–9, and that Report in turn was relied on in the 
drafting of Subsection 113(b) in the 1976 Copyright Act. See 1976  House Rep at 109. 
 196  A list of twelve cases that appeared in the  Supplemental Report of the Register of Copyright 
(1965) at  48 . The primary legislative Report for the current Act mentioned this list with approval. See 
 House Rep .,  supra note 100, at 109. 
 197  Ordinary literary descriptions posed little danger of giving control over systems, given  Baker’ s 
insistence that a book copyright gave no rights over any practical sciences it might describe. 
 198  Again, the statute reads as follows:
 §113 (b) This title does not afford, to the owner of copyright in a work that portrays a useful 
article as such, any greater or lesser rights with respect to the making, distribution, or display of 
the useful article so portrayed than those afforded to such works under the law, whether title 17 
or the common law or statutes of a State, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held applicable and 
construed by a court in an action brought under this title. 
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had uncertain copyright status; because machine-readable copies of literary works 
did not count as infringing, 199 little economically meaningful protection could 
attach even to programs that might in the abstract be eligible for copyright. 200 That 
helps explain why  Baker -oriented caselaw (or any copyright caselaw) on computer 
programs would be scarce. Moreover, at the same time that Congress adopted 
§ 113(b), it adopted a special section to govern computer programs. That special 
provision, Section 117, fi xed the law of computer copyright also at the end of 1977. 201 
 199  See White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). This decision held that copyrights 
could be infringed only by persons making  visually perceptible copies. The decision was overturned 
for most literary works by the Copyright Act of 1976, effective 1978. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defi nition 
of “copies”) (1976); see also  1976 House Rep .,  supra note 100, at 52. Computer programs, however, 
remained governed by 1977 law. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976); see  1976 House Rep .,  supra note 100, at 116. 
 200  Computer source code is visually perceptible without machine aid, and in 1977 source code probably 
could be federally copyrighted. But unauthorized disk copies of source code would not infringe 
because the contents of a CD or other machine-readable disk are not visually perceptible to the naked 
eye. Only with the new 1976 Copyright Act, effective in 1978, did the federal copyright statute embrace 
all embodiments that could be perceived “with the aid of a machine or device.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012):
 “Copies” are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fi xed by any method 
now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, 
or otherwise communicated, either  directly or with the aid of a machine or device. . . . 
(Emphasis added) 
 Therefore the federal protection available to source code would be limited (since unauthorized object 
code copies would not be actionable) and object code itself would be unprotectable under federal 
law. 
  It might be asked whether state protections for computer programs pre-1978 might be relevant. In 
my view, they probably would not. Subsection 113(b) incorporates only caselaw “construed by a court 
in an action brought under this title.” State copyright actions are not “brought under this title.” They 
reach federal court under diversity jurisdiction. 
  The state rights that can appear as pendent claims in an “action brought under this title” are claims 
sounding in state trademark law or other kinds of unfair competition.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (a):
 The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action asserting a claim of  unfair 
competition when joined with a substantial and related claim under the [federal]  copyright , 
patent, plant variety protection or trademark laws. . . . (Emphasis added) 
 Nevertheless, state copyright claims have been brought under a variety of labels, including 
“misappropriation” which is a type of unfair competition. So the potential relevance of pre-1978 state 
copyright law for Subsection 113(b) remains unresolved. 
  Note that in 1978, the federal copyright act abolished most state copyright law. 17 U.S.C. §301 (2012) 
(pre-emption). 
 201  17 U.S.C. §117 (1976) as originally enacted read as follows:
  §117.  Scope of exclusive rights: Use in conjunction with computers and similar information systems. 
  Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 106 through 116 and 118, this title does not afford to 
the owner of copyright in a work any greater or lesser rights with respect to the use of the work 
in conjunction with automatic systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, or transferring 
information, or in conjunction with any similar device, machine, or process, than those afforded to 
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 Then, in 1980, Congress amended § 117 and the copyright act’s defi nitions 202 to 
bring computer programs into modern federal copyright. 203 Also, starting in 1978, 
machine-readable disks counted as “copies” and, if unauthorized, could infringe. 204 
However, Congress did  not amend § 113(b). 
 The upshot: Reading the 1980 amendments in conjunction with the un-amended 
§ 113(b), Congress could be seen as eliminating one barrier to enforcing copyright 
in computer programs but retaining another.  It eliminated the old visual-bound 
defi nition of “copy,” but retained the public’s liberty to employ copyrighted 
portrayals of useful articles to make and sell functioning versions of those articles 
without authorization. 
 11.6.2.  Is  Baker only for accounting forms and other PGS works? 
 Baker v.  Selden 205 dealt with a pictorial work. However, it was not limited to the 
pictorial context. To the contrary, the Court’s analysis took as its touchstone 
the public’s liberty to make machines or use systems described in books. It was 
from examples involving literary works that the Court built the public’s liberty to 
reproduce  Selden’s pictorial accounting forms. 
 Thus, the Court writes:
 [T] there is a clear d istinction between the book as such and the art 206 which it is 
intended to illustrate. . . . A treatise on the composition and use of medicines, be 
they old or new; on the construction and use of ploughs, or watches, or churns; . . . 
would be the subject of copyright; but no one would contend that the copyright of 
the treatise would give the exclusive right to the art or manufacture described . . .  To 
give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the art described therein when 
no examination of its novelty has ever been offi cially made would be a surprise and 
a fraud upon the public. That is the province of letters patent, not of copyright. . . . 207 
works under the law, whether title 11 or the common law or statutes of a State, in effect on December 
31, 1977, as held applicable and construed by a court in an action brought under this title. 
  Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94–553, title I, § 117, Oct. 19, 1976, available at  http://copyright.gov/
history/pl94-553.pdf . 
 202  In 1980, Pub. L. 96–517 inserted a defi nition for “computer program” into the statute, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 203  Pub. L. 96–517. 
 204  The 1980 amendments eliminated the 1977 reference point that had been embedded in § 117, and 
inserted a defi nition of “computer program” as “literary work” into § 101. Pub. L. 96–517 (1980). This 
made the general provisions of the 1976 Copyright Act – and its defi nition of “copy” – applicable to 
programs, so that “unaided” visual perception became irrelevant. 
 205  Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880). 
 206  “Art” in this context refers not to aesthetics but to practical skills, as in the “arts” of husbandry, 
carpentry, or medicine. 
 207  Baker , 101 U.S. at 102 (emphasis added). 
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 The Court repeats and elaborates the point, 208 and returns to new literary-work 
examples, such as books about the art of perspective. 209 
 When the Court fi nally turns to graphic and pictorial works (such as the 
accounting forms at issue in  Baker ), the opinion returns to literary works as its fi rst 
and primary point of reference:
 Had he used words of description instead of diagrams ( which merely stand in the 
place of words ),  there could not be the slightest doubt that others, applying the art 
to practical use, might lawfully draw the lines and diagrams which were in the 
author’s mind, and which he thus described by words in his book. 210 
 Just as a graphic design or a set of diagrams “ merely stand in the place of words ” 211 for 
the Court in  Baker , so can words stand in the place of graphic designs and diagrams 
for § 113(b). 
 To see how closely § 113(b) fi ts  Baker ’s treatment of literary works, note that  Baker’ s 
examples could be restated using the words of the subsection: The subsection tells 
us that an “owner of copyright in a work that portrays a useful article as such” has 
no rights to control the manufacture of the useful article itself. Therefore (turning 
to  Baker’ s examples), the “owner of copyright in a [literary] work that portrays” a 
medicine, system or device, gives no rights to control those who use the book to 
make the medicine, employ the system or build the device. 212 
 11.6.3.  Mixed Uses 
 Baker’s facts seem to describe a purely functional use of the accounting forms. If 
§ 113(b) goes further, and applies even to uses that mix functional and expressive uses, 
the subsection’s sweep against the enforceability of programs will be broad indeed, 
 208  The Court writes:
 . . .Take the case of medicines. Certain mixtures are found to be of great value in the healing 
art. If the discoverer  writes and publishes a book on the subject (as regular physicians generally 
do), he gains no exclusive right to he gains no exclusive right to the manufacture and sale of 
the medicine; he gives that to the public. If he desires to acquire such exclusive right, he must 
obtain a patent for the mixture as a new art, manufacture, or composition of matter.  Id . at 102–3 
(emphasis added) 
 209  Id. at 103. 
 210  Id. at 103 (emphasis added). The Court wrote these works in regard to one of its many examples, 
namely, a “book on perspective.” The opinion quickly made clear,  id. at 104, that these observations 
were directed to  Selden’s accounting forms as well. 
 211  Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1880). The paragraph from which the quoted words are drawn is 
quoted in full just above,  supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 212  In the Court’s words, “The very object of publishing a book on science or the useful arts is to 
communicate to the world the useful knowledge which it contains. But this object would be frustrated 
if the knowledge could not be used without incurring the guilt of piracy of the book.”  Id.  at 103 
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because most copies of computer programs will be used functionally at least in part. 213 
Does § 113(b) extend to mixed uses? 
 The post- Baker cases that give meaning to § 113(b) 214 suggest it might extend so 
far. The cases involved inter alia chairs, lighting fi xtures, and other furnishings that 
various defendants had “built” without permission by copying their competitors’ 
copyrighted drawings and photos. It is highly likely that some of these copyrighted 
pictorial works showed furnishings that contained separable ornamental features, 
such as statuettes on lamp bases or fl ower designs on upholstery. It is even likely that 
some of the copying was motivated by a desire to capitalize on the market appeal of 
such ornamental elements. 
 Yet the courts gave the defendants in these cases the liberty to build and sell working 
duplicates of what appeared in the pictures, without regard to whether or not the 
portrayed objects might have contained separable ornamental features. 215 Consider a 
drawing of a chair that contained a separable work of authorship (such as an original 
design of colors or fl owers applied to the chair seat). These cases seem to suggest that 
the act of constructing the article depicted cannot result in infringement even if the 
defendant’s chair seat bore a duplicate of the separable fl ower design. 216 If so, the limits 
that § 113(b) puts on a copyright owner’s rights apply to shelter copying that is partly 
 213  Source code can be copied for explanatory purposes. For example, open-source licenses typically 
require the sharing of source code in part to explain what a program does and how it does it. See GNU 
Operating System,  GNU General Public License, version 2 ,  Free Software Foundation (Dec. 4, 
2014, 12:39:53 AM),  http://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.en.html . 
  Copying source code for explanatory purposes without license can infringe. Section 113(b) by its 
own terms has no relevance to copying done to serve proper copyright purposes such as explanation 
and amusement. 
 214  The cases are summarized at  supra  notes 120 – 124 . 
 215  “An article that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a useful article.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(2012) (defi nition of useful article). Subsection 113(b) gives rights to build whatever is depicted in the 
drawing of the useful article, which according to this defi nition would include all parts, including 
separable artistic works. 
  Thus, there is no infringement when a stranger without authorization builds a chair that purposely 
duplicates a copyrighted  portrayal – even a portrayal that shows a chair designed with a separable 
ornament. The rule is different if a designer does more than  portray her design in a drawing or sketch, 
but actually builds it. A stranger who builds a chair that purposely duplicates a designer’s as-built chair 
 might infringe if the chair has an ornament that is arguably separable. 
 216  Under this provision’s wording, a designer who sketched a chair (for example) could not use her copyright 
in the two-dimensional sketch to restrain a competitor from building the chair, even if the designer had 
included in her sketch elements of the chair which would be “separable” (and copyrightable) if she 
built the chair. Paul Goldstein criticizes the subsection for exempting the copying of “separable” features 
from a copyrighted portrayal of a useful object, but does not seem to challenge that the subsection has 
that effect. 2  Goldstein On Copyright § 7.4.4.1, 118 (2014). He suggests that a court should fi rst assess 
the copyrightable elements if any in the design being depicted, and then compare that element of 
copyrightable (separable) expression to the appearance of the defendant’s functioning object. 
  Instead, the subsection seems to provide that the designer would have to authorize the construction 
of an actual chair in order to have copyright in the separable components. 
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motivated by expressive concerns. Giving § 113(b) such breadth for PGS works makes 
some sense: no one wants the utilitarian product markets to be subject to strike suits by 
doodlers who see some resemblance between a manufactured product and some fantasy 
sketches they have posted on social media. 217 If the doodlers cannot argue “separability” 
as a way to withstand motions to dismiss – if § 113(b) can be used even by defendants who 
“build” and use a portrayal’s expressive content – patent law may be safer. 
 But for computer programs, it is dangerous to extend § 113(b) to shelter functional 
uses with substantial expressive content. It’s hard to imagine any functional copying of 
source code that could survive a statute so interpreted. Also, if § 113(b) extended that far, 
it would make other computer-related provisions of the Copyright Act surplusage. 218 
  There are some good reasons for requiring the designer to engage in such a two-step dance. Images 
of useful and potentially useful articles abound, from Dufy’s sailboats to Dali’s melting watches. 
Should a designer of actual objects be afraid to take inspiration from the painters and visual fantasists 
who might never  make the three-dimensional objects they have dreamed up and depicted on canvas 
or in print? The § 113(b) rule means that only copying from an actual useful article will make someone 
liable for reproducing the separable (copyrightable) parts. 
  Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly cumbersome to withhold copyright in “separable” parts until the 
designer brings the useful article to life. Paul Goldstein argues as a policy matter that this aspect of 
§ 113(b) should be altered. 
 217  Note that my example here focuses on a plaintiff’s sketches rather than on a plaintiff’s constructed 
design. The law may differ for each context. 
  Subsection 113(b) appears to allow members of the public to build any and all aspects of a useful 
article that they copy from a copyrighted drawing, whether or not any aesthetic element is “separable” 
from the useful components. By contrast, if the designer actually constructed the article in question, 
she could have a copyright in its “separable” elements. 
  The difference in legal result may be attributable to the minor investment required to merely 
sketch a useful article (and thus the greater threat that, in the absence of § 113(b), sketches would pose 
to patent) as compared with the effort required to construct a three-dimensional article. 
 218  In the 1980 amendments to § 117, Congress gave the public some liberties to use computer programs 
functionally. For the public to need such a specifi c set of liberties, Congress would seem to have 
been assuming that (without the specifi ed new liberties) some functional uses of programs  could 
be infringing. If § 113(b) reached mixed uses, then all but the archival portion of § 117 would be 
surplusage. (The liberty to make and keep an archival copy, 17 U.S.C. 117(a) (2)  (2012), does not 
involve a functional use, and thus does not invoke either  Baker or § 113(b).) 
  By contrast, if § 113(b) reaches only uses that are very substantially or purely functional, then 
computer copyrights would remain enforceable against defendants whose purposes are substantially 
related to “style and expression.” (Were copying of programs  never done for purposes related to “style 
and expression,” then Congress certainly  did err – perhaps on a Constitutional level – in accepting 
computer programs into the list of copyrightable works!) 
  In short, a narrow reading § 113(b) leaves untouched all copying that is done for mixed purposes of 
function and expressiveness. If so, § 117 provides liberties that go beyond § 113(b), and applying 113(b) 
to computer programs does not make § 117 surplusage. 
  If copying for  mixed purposes of function and expressiveness is not embraced by  Baker or by 
§ 113(b), a wide range of copying remains potentially open to copyright’s control – that is,  Baker leaves 
untouched all copying that is done for mixed purposes of function and expressiveness. If so, § 117 
provides needed liberties that go beyond § 113(b), and is not surplusage. 
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 As a policy matter, this chapter argues, § 113(b) should either be limited to purely 
functional and nonexpressive uses, or should be limited to PGS works. 
 Limiting the subsection to functional uses that are fully nonexpressive 
is admittedly in some tension with the language of the subsection, for that 
language seems to treat all “portrayals of useful articles” the same. But it must 
be remembered that § 113(b) merely incorporates caselaw, including distinctions 
that the caselaw might embody. Refusing to apply § 113(b) to “mixed” uses is not 
inconsistent with the relevant caselaw. None of the cases I have found explicitly 
say that deference to patent requires giving the public a liberty to construct useful 
articles that have separable and copyrightable parts. Under my more narrow 
reading, then, the subsection would only shelter use that is both functional and 
fully nonexpressive. 
 One fi nal note is needed, regarding the copying of “object code,” that is, copying 
directly from the machine-readable disk to make another disk. 
 11.6.4.  Copying Computer Object Code 
 Subsection 113(b) limits the rights of those who own copyrights in drawings and 
other portrays of useful articles, and does not limit the rights of those who own 
copyrights in useful articles themselves. 219 And useful articles can indeed have 
copyrights. 220 A computer programmer typically does more than “portray” a useful 
article. Consider  Oracle or its predecessor, Sun. They not only created Java source 
code (a “portrayal” of a useful article); they actually created indisputably “useful 
article” namely, Java object code. 
 Even if making a functional copy of a source code (a “portrayal”) is noninfringing 
because of § 113(b), that section is simply inapplicable to acts that copy useful 
articles themselves. Infringement  can result from making a functional copy of 
object code. 
 219  Note that § 113(b) is also inapplicable to cases where the defendant has copied a work that portrays an 
article that is  not useful. This rule does not change even if the copy is then applied to a useful object. 
See Falk v. T. P. Howell & Co., 7 F. 202 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1888) (infringement results from copying an 
artistic work even though the defendant used it to decorate a chair back); 17 U.S.C. § 113(a) (2012). 
 220  Useful articles can have copyright. As mentioned, “PGS works” that are useful articles can be 
copyrighted as to those aspects that pass a “separability” test. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defi ning PGS 
works). “Architectural works” that are useful articles are copyrightable to the extent their features are 
not “functionally required.” See H.R. Rep. No. 101–735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 20–21 (1990),  reprinted in 
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6951–2. Different kinds of useful articles can thus be governed by different 
tests. 
  What tests should govern the copyrightability of computer code is of course much debated in the 
context of  Oracle v.  Google . This chapter does not reach that issue, but rather addresses the question 
of what rights should attach to code even if copyrightable. 
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 As a factual matter, it seems unlikely that  Google copied Java object code. 221 But 
what if a defendant also copied from object code? If so, § 113(b) drops out as a 
potential shelter for that aspect of the defendant’s behavior. 
 Nevertheless, as for all copying, a copyright owner’s rights over the copying of 
object code are governed by Supreme Court precedent, including  Baker. If the 
copying was fully nonexpressive in nature, then under  Baker no infringement of 
copyright would result. 
 11.6.5.  Does the breadth of Subsection 113(b) govern? 
 Baker mandates freedom to copy nonexpressively; its mandate is less clear in cases 
where copying is a mixed case of expressive and nonexpressive use. By contrast, 
§ 113(b) is not limited by inquiry into the defendant’s pure concern with function. It 
is likely that attractive features triggered some of the copying of furniture and lamps 
in the old cases; § 113(b) seems to mandate that the public has freedom to copy 
portrayals of useful articles by building the articles even if the copying was partly 
motivated by a desire to capture expressive elements. 
 Subsection 113(b) thus might sweep more broadly than  Baker itself. 
 Fortunately, in cases of fully nonexpressive copying like  Oracle , the courts need 
not reach the scope of § 113(b).  Baker itself suffi ces. In fact, in the computer context, 
I think that § 113(b) functions best as an echo and reinforcement for  Baker rather 
than an independent source of command. It is nevertheless time for the legal 
community to see that the subsection potentially has signifi cant impact. 
 11.7.  Conclusion 
 Copyright has no inherent interest in governing copying that is indifferent to 
expression, such as copying a letter to present as evidence in a lawsuit, or copying a 
sculptural key shape to unlock a door. To regulate such copying would be foreign to 
 221  Source-code versions of Java commands and input specs were widely available, and evidence in the 
case shows that  Google did indeed use the source code. For example, a “slide show” that Java prepared 
for litigation highlighted this colloquy (from a deposition):
  Q.  Did you consult the Java docs when doing your work on the API implementations for Android? 
  A.  Yes. 
  Q.  Okay. And where did you obtain those Java docs? 
  A.  They’re posted for free on Sun’s website. 
 Deposition of Bob Lee, August 3, 2011, quoted in  Google Employees Consulted Sun’s Copyrighted Java 
Materials When Implementing Android , from Oracle Slideshow, available at  www.cnet.com/pictures/
oracles-slideshow-alleging-how-google-copied-java-images/2/ (last visited June 29, 2015) 
9781107132375c11_p319-372.indd   370 4/5/2016   7:55:38 PM
How Oracle Erred 371
copyright’s interior logic. 222 From an economic perspective, also, incentives to create 
more or better expression can have only random correlation with copying that is 
motivated by expressive-indifferent concerns. 
 Because line-drawing among types of copying can be costly, infringement claims 
need not be struck down every time an act of copying does not “fi t” copyright’s 
expressive paradigm. But often a lack of “fi t” is linked to signifi cant policy concerns. 
In  Baker  v.  Selden the Supreme Court made clear that line-drawing among forms of 
copying is worth the attendant costs, and  must be done, when broad enforcement 
would give copyright law the power to redraw boundaries that Congress has entrusted 
to patent. 
 It is not just caselaw that demonstrates this sensitivity. The Copyright Act also 
includes provisions that limit copyright owners’ rights out of deference to patent law. 
 One such Copyright Act provision, § 113(b), provides that the rights that attach 
to owning copyright in the portrayal of a useful article do not cover the functional 
use – the making or sale – of the useful article itself. Taking the section literally, it 
could immunize defendants who made functional copies of source code because 
source code is a “portrayal” of the useful article known as object code. In the recent 
case of  Oracle v.  Google , it appears that  Google copied from source code rather than 
from object code; if so,  Google’s copying could be sheltered by § 113(b). 
 However, § 113(b) may sweep very broadly, and it is not certain how Congress 
meant its language to be interpreted.  Baker itself can suffi ce to resolve  Oracle v. 
 Google and similar disputes.  Baker indicates that where copying is done with 
indifference to expressive values, and to serve utilitarian goals of the kind that are 
governed by the law of utility patent, copyright infringement should not result. 
 Oracle  v.  Google , like  Lotus  v.  Borland before it, involves a kind of interoperability 
that is needed to fi ght lock-in: interoperability between a newcomer program and 
the relevant public’s habituated skills and its existing macros or other programs. In 
the  Oracle case, the goal of the copying was to help third-party programmers, who 
were habituated to Java, more easily interoperate with  Google’s Android platform. 
 Google’s copying the familiar method headers from Java into Android enabled the 
programmers choose whether or not to work with the Android platform on its merits, 
rather than being discouraged by the switching costs involved in recrafting their 
programming habits. In  Lotus , the goal of the copying was to help customers of an 
established spreadsheet program decide whether or not to choose a new spreadsheet 
program on its merits, rather than being held to the old program by the switching 
costs involved in learning new meanings for keys and recreating macros. 
 222  For one eloquent view of this interior logic, see  Drassinower , discussed  supra   at note 126 and 
following. 
9781107132375c11_p319-372.indd   371 4/5/2016   7:55:38 PM
Wendy J. Gordon372
 In both these cases, the plaintiff’s programs were not copied because they 
embodied skilled expression; in both cases the defendants carried the “heavy lifting” 
of creating new implementation code independently. What copying occurred was 
not done to spare the defendants the effort, money, or other resources that would be 
involved in creating high-quality expression. Instead, the copying was done for the 
purpose of conforming with exactness to whatever the dominant program specifi ed; 
the copying was done without regard to the quality, vel non, of what was copied. 
 Under the canonical case of  Baker  v.  Selden , as reinforced by  Baker’ s progeny 
in both caselaw and the copyright statute, the copying in  Lotus and  Oracle did not 
infringe. And this conclusion need not follow from copyrightability, or from “fair 
use,” but from the plaintiff’s lack of prima facie right to control functional use. 
Going forward in  Oracle and other cases that charge infringement of computer 
copyrights,  Baker’ s “use/explanation” distinction can play a clarifying role. Patent 
law gives the public rights to copy and to use 223 that  Baker , its progeny, and the 
pattern of the copyright statute all tell us copyright should not undo. 
 223  Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 164–5 (1989). 
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